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INTRODUCTION

NEARS its seventieth birthday, the Warsaw Convention
K asITonce
more proven that it does not wish to exit the stage
1

yet.
On October 30, 1995, at its Annual General Meeting in Kuala
Lumpur, the representatives of the six regions of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) unanimously adopted
an Intercarrier Agreement (IIA), which has been broadly regarded as the long-awaited change in the legal regime that relates to one of the major problems of international air transport:
how to deal with damage claims brought for death or injury to
passengers on international flights. A majority of IATA's members have since agreed to include in their conditions of carriage,
a provision that would waive the liability limits set by the Warsaw
Convention and its progeny.
In December 1995, just after the IIA was adopted, the Commission of the European Union drafted a proposal for a Council
Regulation on carrier liability that, with the principal intent of
achieving a uniform and fair system of airline liability (at least
within the European Union), also waived the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.
Notwithstanding the several improvements accomplished by
the IATA and European initiatives, the two principal goals to be
pursued in any attempt to reform the Warsaw Convention (i.e.,
uniform rules and fair damage compensation) have not been
fully achieved. Although the liability limits will largely disappear
from the conditions of carriage of most of the world's air carriers, questions like applicable law, jurisdiction, mandatory insurance, liability defenses, adequate notice, up-front payments,
mutual liabilities, and indemnification rights have not been adequately resolved. The answers to these questions will differ depending both on the regime governing the particular contract
of carriage and on several other factors like the nationality of
the carrier or the destination of the flight.
Accordingly, it seems more evident today than ever that the
only way an adequate and uniform regime for international air
transport can be achieved is through intergovernmental action
modifying the Warsaw Convention. In May 1997, the Legal
Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International

Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 876
U.N.T.S. 11 (1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
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(ICAO) took the first step toward such a system by adopting a
draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air.
This Article will offer a brief survey of the Warsaw Convention
and its progeny. It will analyze, in detail, the IATA initiative,
including its content and implementation. It will also comment
on the content and evolution of the European regulation. Finally, the article will review the accomplishments of the latest
initiatives and the issues that still need to be resolved, along with
a brief analysis of the recent draft Convention approved by the
ICAO Legal Committee.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE WARSAW
CONVENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Before analyzing the content and implementation of the two
IATA Intercarrier agreements and the European Regulation, it
is important to give a brief survey of what was accomplished in
the field of international air transportation law up to the moment the IATA agreements were signed and the Commission
Proposal was drafted. The reader will be introduced to the
world's most widely adopted (and perhaps its most widely
maligned) private international law treaty, the 1929 Warsaw
Convention, and to the many changes this so-called "Warsaw System" has undergone through the years.
A.

THE WARSAW SYSTEM:

A

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

Air carrier liability for accidents in international carriage by
air is basically governed by the 1929 Warsaw Convention as supplemented by certain other instruments.2 Notwithstanding its
age, the Warsaw Convention still represents the principal piece
of legislation on international aviation law. Designed at a time
when the commercial air transportation industry was first
emerging and the Convention's principal goal was to limit and
define the potential liability of carriers in claims for death or
personal injury caused by accidents in international air travel.
Such a limitation was intended to "attract capital that might
2 The other instruments include the Hague Protocol of 1955, the Guadalajara
Convention of 1961 and the 1966 Montreal Agreement. See infra notes 15, 19,
and 22.
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otherwise be scared away by the fear of a single catastrophic
accident."'
The Convention provided that carriers are liable for damage
sustained by a passenger in the course of a flight or while embarking or disembarking (Article 17), but limited this liability to
125,000 Poincar6 francs (roughly the equivalent of U.S. $8300)
at that time. In exchange for such a limit, which was considered
low even in 1929,' the Convention, first, rendered null and void
any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a
limit lower than 125,000 Poincar6 francs,5 and secondly, shifted
the burden of proof so that the carrier was presumed liable unless it could prove that either it had taken all necessary measures
to avoid damages or that it was impossible for the carrier to take
such measures.6 Additionally, where the passenger could show
willful misconduct or equivalent conduct, on the part of the carrier, the limits of liability set out in Article 17 would not apply.'
The other main goal of the Convention was to develop uniform rules governing air travel, particularly in the international
setting. It was clear even then, that commercial aviation travel
was "expanding into many countries having different customs,
languages, social identities, and legal systems." 8 The Convention addresses the issue of uniformity almost completely in regard to documentation, like passenger tickets, baggage checks,
and air waybills, and only to a certain degree as to the procedures for dealing with claims arising out of an international
flight and the substantive law applicable to such claims.9 Besides
providing for a two-year period of limitation' ° and a rule by
which the passenger (or his or her descendants) is limited by
being able only to bring suit against the carrier that was performing the part of the transportation involved in the accident," the Convention designated only four fora in which
3 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 499 (1967).
4 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 7-27 (2d ed.
1981).
5 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 29.
6 See id., art. 20(1).
7 See id., art. 25.
8 David I. Sheinfeld, Comment, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A ChronologicalAnalysis
of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. &
COM. 653, 658 (1980).
9 LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at 7-27.
10 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 29.
" See id., art. 30(2).
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actions could be brought: the domicile of the carrier, the principal place of business of the carrier, the place of business of the
carrier through which the contract was made, and the place of
destination. 12

Since 1929 there have been several attempts, most of them
unsuccessful, to somehow improve the Convention's liability regime. In fact, it did not take a long time for the limitation provided in Article 22 to become inadequate and unreasonable.
Several objections were raised by those arguing for higher limits.
In developed countries like the United States, for example,
awards in personal injury and death actions were far higher than
the limits permitted by the Warsaw Convention. Secondly, liability insurance could be obtained by the carrier at a lower cost
per passenger mile than originally had been possible, not only
because of the increased ability of the carrier, aided by technological progress, to provide safe transportation but also because
of the burgeoning international insurance marketplace following Wold War II. 13 By 1965 liability insurance costs were a mini-

mal part of the operating costs of the carrier. 4
Industry-wide dissatisfaction and the consequent need for
5
modification of the liability limit led to the Hague Protocol'

and the Warsaw Convention in 1955, which only managed to
double the previous limit from 125,000 to 250,000 Poincarr6
francs (about U.S. $16,600), and amended Article 25 by introducing an intentional or reckless misconduct standard to replace the willful misconduct standard. 6 The United States
actively participated in and voted for the Protocol, but while a

12 See id., art. 28. In actual practice, a carrier's domicile and its principal place
of business are usually the same. Article 28, therefore, allows only three fora
where suit can be brought.
13 See LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at 7-99.
14 See Sheinfeld, supra note 8, at 659.
15 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371,
ICAO Doc. No. 7686-LC/140 [hereinafter Hague Protocol], reprinted in ANDREAS LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 955 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
16 "Willful misconduct" (or the equivalent thereof according to the court to
which the case is submitted) was replaced by "the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carriers, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage
or recklessly and with knowledge that the damage would probably result." See
Hague Protocol, supra note 15. This was intended to make it more difficult to
"break" the limit.
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relatively large number of countries ratified the Hague Protocol,
17
the United States never did.
After the United States announced its withdrawal from the
Warsaw Convention in 1965,18 international carriers, with the
help of IATA, signed the so-called Montreal Interim Agreement,
which raised the liability limit to U.S. $75,000. At the same time,
the agreement required airlines to waive the Article 20(1) defense for damage claims up to that limit. 9 The Montreal Agreement, 20 which was neither an international treaty nor a formal
amendment of the Warsaw Convention, had its legal foundation
in Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention which, after setting
the limit of liability, states that "by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability. ' ' 2 1 The
agreement was intended to apply, however, only to flights with a
point of origin, destination, or an agreed stopping point in the
United States; and only those airlines that signed the agreement
were bound by its terms, although almost every airline serving
the United States ultimately signed. Additionally, in accordance
with Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, the new limit set by
the Montreal Agreement could be broken if the passenger could
establish that the damage was caused by the reckless or willful
conduct of the carrier. In May 1966, once the Montreal Agreement became generally accepted, the United States withdrew its
notice of denunciation and remained a party to the Warsaw
Convention.
In 1971, in a further attempt to reach a satisfactory international system, representatives at ICAO's international conference on air law at Guatemala City, agreed to amend the Warsaw
Convention. Under the Guatemala Protocol,2 2 carrier limits
would be increased to U.S. $100,000, exclusive of legal fees and
17 One hundred and eleven countries are currently parties to the Hague
Protocol.
18 For the history of these events, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3,
at 503.
19Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by
Executive Order No. 23,680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal
Agreement], reprintedin ANDREAS LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 971 (2d ed. Documents Supp. 1981).
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on September 1955, Mar. 8, 1971,
64 Dep't St. Buil. 55 [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol].
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costs,2" the liability of the carrier would be absolute (there
would not be an Article 20(1) defense), but the damage limitation could not be exceeded in any way (i.e., the limit of liability
would be unbreakable) due to the fact that the reckless or willful misconduct standard of Article 25 would be deleted). In addition, states would be permitted to establish supplemental
compensation plans within their territories over and above the
initial U.S. $100,000 recovery, which would be financed by contributions made by the passengers (i.e., a surcharge or a higher
ticket price). Further, Article 28 of the Convention would be
amended to permit a passenger to sue in the courts of his or her
domicile if the carrier had a place of business in that state and
the state was a party to the Convention. 24 To preserve a certain
degree of uniformity it was decided that, for the protocol to take
effect, thirty countries would have to ratify the agreement, five
of which would have to comprise forty percent of air travel of
ICAO member nations. Twenty-two nations ratified the Guatemala Protocol, but for various reasons, the United States refused
to do so. 25 Since the United States comprised such a large por-

tion of international air travel, without United States ratification, the Guatemala Protocol has become ineffective.
In 1975, at the next ICAO meeting in Montreal, yet another
amendment to the Warsaw Convention, known as Montreal Protocol No. 3 (MAP3), was adopted.26 MAP3 altered Warsaw's
monetary unit for calculating the limitation on recovery. Because of economic events affecting the stability of world gold
prices, the 1975 Conference replaced the Poincarr6 franc with
the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights
(SDR) as the new basic monetary unit of the Warsaw Convention. 27 Other than this, MAP3 was essentially the same docu23 See Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention: Cutting the GordianKnot and the 1995
IntercarrierAgreement, 22 SYRAcusE J. INT'L L. & COM. 67, 74 (1996).
24 See id.
25 So far as the authors are aware, the United States never explained why it
ultimately did not adopt a supplemental compensation plan, e.g., one with no
limits (that would then have made possible United States notification of the Guatemala Protocol).
26 Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air): Montreal Protocols 3 Providing Higher
Liability Limits, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol
No. 3 or MAP3]. MAP 1, 2, and 4 did not affect the liability regime for passengers and, hence, will not be addressed in this article.
27 SDR's were first issued in January 1970 at a value of 0.888671 grams of fine
gold, precisely equal to the U.S. dollar. The IMF decided to fix the value of the
SDR in terms of a "basket" of 16 currencies. As the dollar changed value, the SDR
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ment adopted in 1971 at Guatemala City. It provided for
absolute liability, a settlement inducement clause, an unbreakable limit of SDR 100,000 (approximately U.S. $117,000), and
the express right of each party to the Convention to establish a
Supplemental Compensation Plan within its territory. Because
of various problems, including disagreement on the appropriate
limit for a supplemental compensation plan, the United States
did not ratify MAP3 2 8
B.

UNILATERAL STEPS TAKEN BY SINGLE COUNTRIES, AIRLINES,
OR GROUPS OF AIRLINES

It is fair to say that the American government was not alone in
seeking to modernize the liability limitation provided in the
Warsaw-Hague system. As early as 1967, British airlines fell
under public pressure because of the low liability limits under
the Hague Protocol (and because of the limited geographical
application of the Montreal Agreement), and they began to
enter into special contracts, with higher limits on liability, as a
matter of routine. 29 By 1974, formal support for the Montreal
initiative and its limits of liability was expressed in a press state30
ment issued on behalf of thirteen European countries:
It is considered that the limits of liability under the WarsawHague system are unacceptably low and that the application of
the Montreal Agreement gives rise to inequalities. Accordingly
most Western European countries have been considering steps to
ensure that in the case of death or personal injury to passengers
their airlines will accept a limit of liability approximately equal to
U.S. $58,000, expressed in national currencies. For airlines of
some of these countries that limit is already applicable and in
others governmental action is taking place. This action affects
only the airlines of those countries. It is hoped that most Western European airlines will introduce similar arrangements in the
near future. Some countries are contemplating December 1,
1974, as the effective date. 3 '
retained its original value, so that by 1973 one SDR was equal to U.S. $1.20635.
See LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at 7-171. See also infra notes 43-44.
28 See Naneen K. Baden, Comment, The JapaneseInitiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 447 (1995-96).
29 See CHRISTOPHER N. SHAWCROSS & KENNETH M.

BEAUMONT, AIR LAW § VII/

159 (4th ed. 1996).
30 Original signatories to the Agreement were: Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom.
31 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at § VII/14.
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In 1975 British authorities required British airline license
holders to provide a minimum of 25,000 Pound Sterling as a
liability limit to each passenger (approximately U.S. $60,000 on
April 1, 1975).32 This limit was increased in 1981 to the Sterling
equivalent of SDR 100,000 (then roughly the equivalent of U.S.
$120,000). 33 Following the British lead, other airlines decided
to voluntarily raise their liability limitation to the Montreal level
likewise relying on Warsaw's Article 22(1). 34 In June 1975, the
U.S. Attorney-General's Department approved a proposal by
Quantas to increase its liability for passenger injury or death
pursuant to the Montreal Agreement in respect of all its international routes. At the time, the department held the responsibility for the administration of the Australian Civil Aviation
(Carriers' Liability) Act of 1959. 3 1 In Italy, the state-owned airline, Alitalia, voluntarily adopted a liability limit of U.S. $90,000,
except for flights to and from the United States, where the lower
limits of the Montreal Agreement still applied. 6 Japanese and
other airlines followed thereafter.
By 1981, other agreements created increased liability limits in
excess of the Warsaw limitations for transportation not involving
the United States (i.e., non-Montreal Agreement flights) .
Throughout the 1980's, other increases followed with still

352 See David Cohen, Montreal Protocol: The Most Recent Attempt to Modify the Warsaw Convention, VIII AIR LAW 146, 157 (1983).
" See id. The new limit became effective April 1, 1981. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at § VII/159.
34 See TITO BALLARINO & SILVIO BUSTI, DIRITTo AERONAUTICO E SPAZIALE 647-48
(Dott A. Giuffre ed., 2d ed. 1988).
3' See Praveen M. Singh, InternationalAir Charter Transportation in Australia, 5
AIR LAW 219, 221 (1980).
36 The Italian authorities authorized these limits, which were adopted by the
end of the 1970's by all other smaller Italian airlines. See BALLARINO & BUSTI,
supra note 34, at 648.
37 See generally, David Cohen, Happy Birthday: Agreement C.A.B. 18900, 7 AIR LAW
74 (1982).
The governments of France (for domestic flights), Ireland, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland require a liability limit of at least U.S.
$58,000; Air Afrique, Austrian Airlines, Sabena, Burma Airways,
SAS, TACA, Finnair, Air France, Air Inter, UTA, Lufthansa, Condor, El Al, Alitalia, Japan Airlines, Alia, Middle East Airlines, Luxair, MAS, KLM, Martinair, Transavia, Air New Zealand, Air Panama,
Singapore Airlines, South African Airways, Iberia, Thai, and Tunis
Air offer liability limits of at least U.S. $58,000.
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higher liability limits. 3 8 Unlike the Montreal Agreement carri-

ers, however, most non-U.S. carriers did not waive the benefit of
the defense provided by Article 20.
By 1995, the limits of liability ranged from U.S. $75,000 in the
United States, to U.S. $150,000 in most of Europe4" and U.S.
$350,000 in Australia.41
C.

PROBLEMS WITH THE WARSAW SYSTEM

The general criticism toward the Warsaw system from both
the airline industry and the passenger perspectives is understandable for the following reasons.
1.

Non-Uniformity

Uniformity in the liability system sought by the proponents of
the Warsaw Convention, if it ever existed, started to disintegrate
a long time ago. Even without taking into account the several
unilateral steps taken by single countries, airlines, or groups of
airlines in the past two decades, at least three different sets of
rules relating to airlines' liability for passengers' death or injury
The Italian Parliament increased to 100,000 SDR's in 1988. See BALLARINO &
supra note 34, at 311. In the United Kingdom, although the UK license
condition still imposes a 100,000 SDR limit on UK-registered carriers, "British
Airways' Conditions of Carriage expressly provide that a limit of 130,000 SDRs
applies on British Airways service which would otherwise be subject to the Montreal Agreement limit, i.e., [sic.] the higher of the two limits apply." SHAWCROSS &
BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at § VII/ 158 citing BRITISH AIRWAYS CONDITIONS OF
CARRIAGE, art. 16,
2(a). "By 1990, "all Japanese airlines were ... voluntarily
applying a limit of 100,000 SDR's . . .by 'special contract' to passengers whose
carriage was subject to the Convention." Id. Anthony G. Mercer, The Montreal
Protocols and the Japanese Initiative: Can the Warsaw System Survive?, 19 AIR & SPACE
L. 301 (1994).
39 See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at § VII/159. However, Warsaw
Article 20 defenses were waived by some United Kingdom airlines as part of their
special contracts. These defenses were also waived by Quantas Airways from and
to Australia, Gibraltar Airways from and to Gibraltar, Middle East Airlines from
and to Lebanon and Thai International Airlines from and to Thailand. See Cohen, supra note 32, at 164 n.230.
40 For a detailed list of the liability limits in EC countries, see Commission
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Air Carrier Liability in Case of Accidents, 1996 O.J. (C 104) 18 [hereinafter EC Proposal].
41 It is interesting that for almost 30 years the United States saw limits rising
around the world but did nothing to increase the U.S. $75,000 limit in the Montreal Agreement. This may be partly explained by the fact that in highly publicized disasters, like Lockerbie and KAL 007, U.S. Courts found willful
misconduct under Article 25 and held that the limits did not apply. See infra note
48 and accompanying text.
38
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on an international flight exist: (1) the Warsaw Convention of
1929 with its presumed liability and limitation of U.S. $8300; (2)
the Warsaw Convention as modified by the 1955 Hague Protocol
with its limitation of U.S. $16,600; and (3) the 1966 Montreal
Agreement with its absolute liability up to U.S. $75,000.
Considering every Article 20(1) special contract that raised
the liability limit of Warsaw-Hague in the past two decades,
whether voluntary or mandated by national regulation, the liability regime of carriers changes depending on both the contracting airline and the route of the particular flight. "There is a
plethora of mandated limits and Montreal Agreement type voluntary limits... [such that it] is becoming difficult to find more
than a few major States where an unmodified Warsaw Conven'42
tion or Hague Protocol limitation is still in effect.

2. Low Liability Limits
In spite of all the measures taken by governments and airlines
to increase the Warsaw-Hague limits, the coverage afforded to
passengers on international flights in case of injury or death remained inexcusably low.4" Inflation4 4 and the introduction of
the "two-tier" gold standard 45 rendered even the new voluntary
limits just as inadequate as the earlier limits of Warsaw-Hague.
Hence, claimants have tried different ways to get around such
limitations and secure full compensation. Among them, the
Cohen, supra note 32, at 167.
The Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice published a study in November 1988 examining the outcomes of claims involving 2228 deaths in the 25
worst crashes involving U.S. airlines in the period 1979 to 1984. It found that
surviving relatives received on average U.S. $363,000, but estimated the true economic loss at U.S. $749,000 per case. These figures are much higher than the
U.S. $75,000 limit under the Montreal Agreement and the 100,000 SDR limit in
many special contracts (equivalent in 1988 to approximately U.S. $136,000).
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at § VII-159-10.
44 A 1989 IFAPA study reported a 150% inflation record in OECD countries
since 1971. By the end of 1990, 100,000 SDRs were worth approximately U.S.
$144,000. If movements in the relevant consumer price indices since 1971 are
taken into account, the real value to a U.S. claimant would be U.S. $53,300 in
1971 terms. See id.
45 In the 1970's the central banks of most of the western countries adopted the
"two-tier" standard and the price of gold in private transactions began to fluctuate, while the official value was kept stable by governments. Since several courts
used the official value as the standard for calculating the Warsaw-Hague limit, the
"value" of the damages recovered by Warsaw plaintiffs dropped even further. See
BALLARINO & BUSTI, supra note 34, at 642.
42

41

1999]

IATA AGREEIMENTS/EUROPEAN REGULATION

389

most frequently used are forum shopping, 6 claims against multiple defendants, 47 and the willful misconduct and notice exceptions of the Warsaw Convention.48 Even though courts are often
willing to go along with plaintiffs and "break" the limitation,
such a practice not only causes greater uncertainty and non-uniformity in the interpretation and application of the Warsaw
Convention worldwide, but it also produces prodigious delays in
resolving disputes and distributing damage awards to the victims
and the families.
3. Lack of a General Provision on Applicable Law
The Warsaw Convention does not contain a general choice of
law provision to determine the size and scope of damage awards
(i.e., the laws of the country that are used to determine damages). The Convention contains specific choices of law clauses
that point to the lex otri: (1) Article 21 on contributory negligence; (2) Article 24(2) on standing; and (3) Article 29(2) on
calculation of time limits. Additionally, the criteria for determining damages are left to the conflict of law rules of the court
in which the suit is brought. Because every country's law of
damages is different and the application of the proper set of
rules in a particular case may result in a more favorable decision
for either the plaintiff or the defendant, the judicial battle over
the law applicable to the determination of recoverable damages
is always fought very intensely in a Warsaw case. The battle inevitably carries with it, among other consequences, prolonged and
46 United States courts are favored by non-U.S. claimants because of the
greater tendency of United States courts to "break" the liability limits, the higher
awards rendered by U.S. juries in favor of accident victims, and the possibility of
receiving punitive damages. See id.
47 Claims against the manufacturer or the air traffic control facility have often
been joined in lawsuits in order to obtain jurisdiction in the United States and to
broaden the pool of defendants. This increases the chance of avoiding the limits
and receiving unlimited compensation. See id.
48 The Warsaw-Hague liability limitation can be overcome either by showing
willful misconduct on the part of the carrier or by demonstrating that the passenger has not been given proper notice pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention. See
Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.P.A., 370 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that a ticket in lilliputian print does not satisfy the Article 3 notice requirement and, therefore, unlimited liability was appropriate). But see Chan v. Korean
Air Lines Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 129 (1989) (appearing to overrule Lisi by holding
that the limit may be broken only if a carrier failed to deliver any document, or
the quality of the document is so poor that it cannot reasonably be described as a
'ticket', such as a blank form).
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expensive litigation, forum shopping, and non-uniform and unfair results.
4. Fori Domicilii Not Available to Plaintiff
Selection of the proper forum can make a very substantial difference in a Warsaw case. Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld has
stated that "determination of the applicable law is only a small
part of the task of fixing compensation for international transport accidents. In fact, once special provisions designed to implement Warsaw are cast aside, the law of accident
compensation is pretty much the same in all countries."49
Although Lowenfeld may underestimate the relevance of the applicable law, he is certainly on point when he asserts that "the
most significant differences in accident compensation come in
the conditions of litigation, actual or potential. 5 ° Some of the
litigation factors that play a major role in the determination of
damage awards are: (1) the availability of contingency fee arrangements; (2) whether the damage award is made by ajudge,
a group of judges, or a jury; (3) the competence of the court;
(4) the level of litigiousness of the particular country; and (5)
the community's view on the value of a person's life. These are
practically more important than the law according to which the
damages are determined.
Although Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention lists four different places where the plaintiff may file suit, it does not provide
for the court of the passenger's domicile (the so-called fifth forum). Denying the plaintiff his fori domicilii often results in damage awards that differ from the amount usually awarded by the
courts of the plaintiff's domicile. 5 ' This is especially true from
the perspective of the "wandering American" (i.e., the U.S. citizen who travels or works abroad), who could be barred from
suing in a U.S. court if the permissible four foi of Article 28 do
49 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Postscript and Warning, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 187, 188
(1996).
Focusing on application of a given law can tell us whether collateral
benefits .... are or are not to be deducted from an award of damages; .. .whether such elements of damages as loss of consortium,

grief, or pain and suffering before death are or are not to be taken
into account; and under what circumstances (if at all) punitive
damages may be awarded.
Id.
50

Id.

See Allan 1. Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws, Approach to the Warsaw Convention,
33J. AIR L. & COM. 624, 630 (1967).
51
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not include a U.S. court.12 Several commentors view such a result as unfair and unjust, believing that air accident victims
should receive compensation according to the standards of the
country of their domicile.5 3 But it is not only the "wandering
American" that raises the problem. What about the German or
French citizen who purchases a ticket in Beijing for a Beijing-toLos Angeles-to-Beijing flight on a Chinese airline. Should they
be limited to suing only in Beijing, which is currently the only
permissible forum under Article 28? Or should they be allowed
to sue in a court in Germany or France where the Chinese carrier does business?

D.

THE JAPANESE INITIATVE OF

1992

The adoption by Japanese airlines of new conditions of carriage in November 1992 represented the most significant development in the liability levels of international airlines since the
Montreal Agreement of 1966. It was a decisive turning-point in
the history of the Warsaw system. In 1992, airlines were faced
with public and scholarly pressure asking for a new special contract under Article 22 (1) of the convention with higher limits of
liability. Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airways and Japan Air Systems responded by voluntarily waiving the limits of liability entirely and the Article 20(1) defense up to SDR 100,000
(approximately U.S. $140,000) for passengers whose carriage on
the services of those airlines is subject to the Warsaw-Hague regime.5 4 This resulted in a two-tier system: absolute liability up to
SDR 100,000 and unlimited liability under a presumption of
negligence.
At the end of 1993, with no other airlines willing to follow the
Japanese lead, IATA filed with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) an application for approval of, and anti-trust immunity for, discussion authority to update the Warsaw/HagueMontreal System. The intercarrier discussions for which authority and immunity were sought concerned the limits and condi52 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Warsaw Convention and Where We Are Today, 62J.

AIR L. & COM. 1071, 1078 (1997) (article adapted from a speech given in Montreal, Canada on October 26, 1996, before an International Symposium convened by McGill University's Institute of Air and Space Law).
53 The first author who proposed the adoption of lex domicilii as the choice of
law criteria for the determination of damages under Warsaw was Professor Allan
I. Mendelsohn. See generally, Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 624.
54 See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at § VII/159 D-E.
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tions of passenger liability established by the
Convention, specifically Articles 20(1) and 22(1). 55
III.
A.

THE

Warsaw

THE IATA AGREEMENTS
1995 KuALA LUMPUR AGREEMENT

On October 30, 1995, at the Annual General Meeting of IATA
in Kuala Lumpur, the representatives unanimously adopted an
Intercarrier Agreement (IIA), which represented the latest effort by the airline industry to modernize the Warsaw system.56
Like the 1966 Montreal Agreement, the IIA is an inter-airline
agreement that finds its legal basis in Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention and which does not necessarily require govern5
mental approval for its enforcement:
1.

Its Content: A Statement of Purpose
The IIA was, without doubt, only a statement of purpose. The
interesting thing about this statement of purpose, however, was
that the purpose itself was not entirely clear. The reason for this
is simple: IATA is an international association which represents
more than 230 airlines in six different continents, and a consensus within the association on the future of the liability regime
for international air transportation was at that time far away. In
fact, only a minority of the IATA members favored a two-tier
system similar to the one introduced by the Japanese airlines in
1992. The majority was staunchly opposed to the elimination of
the liability limitation, and preferred, instead, only an increase
in the level of that limitation. In a questionnaire sent out by the
ICAO in February 1995, only three of the seventy-two member
States replying to the questionnaire 51 were in favor of unlimited
liability (the United States was, of course, one of them).59
55 See id.
IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, opened for signatureOct.

51

31, 1995 [herinafter 1IA], reproduced in 21 AIR & SPACE L. 24 (1996).
57 See Lyall, supra note 23, at 77. For articles on the IATA agreements from the
European perspective, see Peter Martin, The 1995 IATA IntercarrierAgreement, 21
AIR & SPACE L. 17 (1996); Peter Martin, The 1995 IATA IntercarrierAgreement: An
Update, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 126 (1996) [hereinafter Martin, Update]; David B.Johnston, 1996: A Watershed for Warsaw? A UK Perspective, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 189
(1996).
58 More than 180 countries have signed the ICAO-Convention.
59 See Wolf Mfieller-Rostin, The IATA IntercarrierAgreement-The Thoughts of an

Yet Unconvinced, 15 LL~oYD's

AVIATION LAW

1, 2 (1996).

Most responding States (and carriers) from Africa/Caribbean and
Middle East favoured the adoption of a limit of SDR 100,000. On
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In order to reach an agreement that could be accepted by a
large number of the IATA members, a compromise had to be
found (or imposed). That compromise is found in the first two
paragraphs of the Kuala Lumpur Agreement:60
The undersigned carriers agree
1. To take action to waive the limitation of liability on recoverable compensatory damages in Articles 22, paragraph 1 of the
Warsaw Convention as to claims for death, wounding or other
bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of Article 17 of
the Convention, so that recoverable compensatory damages may
be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of the passenger.
2. To reserve all available defenses pursuant to the provision of
the Convention; nevertheless, any carrier may waive any defense,
including the waiver of any defense up to a specified monetary
amount of recoverable
compensatory damages, as circumstances
61
may warrant.
The compromise was apparently reached because, by signing
this Agreement, an airline was not necessarily agreeing to the
Japanese two-tier system of "unlimited" and "absolute up-to-acertain-amount-liability." It was merely given the option to apply
such a two-tier system. Thus, the Agreement does not mandate
absolute liability, but affords each carrier the option of waiving
62
the Article 20(1) defense up to a particular monetary amount.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the first paragraph of the
Agreement does not mandate that signatory airlines adopt unlimited liability. The parties only agreed "to waive the limitation
so that recoverable compensatory damages may be determined
by reference to the law of the domicile of the passenger. '' 6' At
the other hand most of the responding States from Asia/Pacific,
Europe and North America favoured raising the limit to some SDR
250,000 or more, with three States: Japan, Switzerland, and the
United States, suggesting that there should be no limits.
Ronald Schmid, The Warsaw Convention Between Dusk and Dawn, 22 AmR & SPACE L.
50, 51 (1997) (quotations omitted).
6 IIA, supra note 56, § 1.
61 Id.
62 Under the Warsaw system, even though the carrier is presumed liable for
damages sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger under Article 17, Article 20(1) of the
Convention permits air carriers to avoid such liability by proving that the airline
and its agents have taken "all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it
was impossible for.., them to take such measures." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, at 11.
63 IIA, supra note 56, § 1.
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the time the IATA representatives agreed to that text, there was
no consensus on how to interpret or implement the text. That
sentence was just a statement of purpose, and, as is evidenced by
the Explanatory Note to the Agreement," the question of its
implementation was intentionally left open for resolution at a
later time.6" Although there were several options for interpreting and implementing the language of the IIA, only two merit
discussion:
(a) The first option was to waive the limits and nothing else in
other words, an unconditional waiver. By waiving the limitation
set by the Convention, the statement of intent of paragraph 1
was automatically set so that "recoverable compensatory damages may be determined by reference to the law of the domicile
of the passenger.

66

(b) The second option, on the contrary, involved attributing
real meaning to the reference to the law of the passenger's domicile and, accordingly, limiting the scope of the "waiver," so that
even those airlines that did not favor a two-tier liability system
would be inclined to sign the IA. 67 By following this option, a
6 After stating that the "Intercarrier Agreement is an 'umbrella accord"' ac-

cording to which the signatory carriers "undertake to waive the limitations of
liability as are set out in the Warsaw Convention (1929), The Hague Protocol
(1955), the Montreal Agreement of 1966, and/or limits they may have previously
agreed to implement or were required by Governments to implement," the Explanatory Note goes on to say that "such waiver by a carrier may be made conditional on the law of the domicile of the passenger governing the calculation of
the recoverable compensatory damages under the Intercarrier Agreement." EC
Proposal, Explanatory Memo, supra note 40. The Note then specifies that "this is
an option" and that "should a carrier wish to waive the limits of liability but not
insist on the law of the domicile of the passenger governing the calculation of the
recoverable compensatory damages, or not be so required by a governmental
authority, it may rely on the law of the court to which the case is submitted." Id.
The Note thus leaves the signatory airlines with more than one option, apparently without giving preference to any option in particular.
65 Because of the several options left open to the signatory airlines, the 1995
IATA Agreement has often been referred to as an "umbrella agreement."
6 IIA, supra note 56. Under this option, use of the term "may" leaves it to the
court that decides the case whether to use the law of the domicile of the passenger. The reference to the law of the domicile of the passenger was thus just a
statement of explanation of what could happen if an airline waived limits.
67 See id. It has been said that the reason underlying such an approach was to
avoid any infringement of the social policies of the law of the domicile of the
passenger, which might have occurred if the waiver of the liability limitation was
required to be made unconditional (i.e., a citizen of a third world country could
in that case sue under U.S. law and would be able to get a much higher reward
because the law of his or her own country will certainly be less favorable). See
Bert Rein, Address at the Conference The International Airline Passenger Liabil-
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signatory airline would not only waive the liability limitation, but
also specify the law of the passenger's domicile as the applicable
law for determining the amount of damages to be awarded to
the passenger. Under this scenario, the limitation would disappear and the damages would be determined (contractually) according to the law of the passenger's domicile.
2.

The Two Options at Work

The practical difference between the two options or interpretations lies in the scope of the waiver itself and, consequently, in
the amount of damages that the passenger may recover. Since
the distinction between the two options may still be relevant today, as will be discussed later in this article, it seems important
to illustrate such a distinction with a practical example: A bright
Italian law student with a promising future, temporarily living in
the United States, flies home for the Christmas holidays from
Washington, D.C. to Rome on a U.S. carrier that has signed the
IIA. Under Italian law, the life of this twenty-six-year-old student
is worth approximately U.S. $200,000, while under U.S. law, that
same life may be worth as much as U.S. $2,000,000. If the U.S.
carrier has adopted the first option (i.e., unconditional waiver),
the amount of compensatory damages recoverable by the family
of the Italian student will be either U.S. $200,000 or $2,000,000
depending on the law applied by the court where suit is
brought. If suit is brought in the United States under Article 28
of the Convention, 68 and the U.S. court applies U.S. law, then
the award can reach U.S. $2,000,000. If the court applies Italian
law, however, the amount of damages recovered by the family of
the Italian student can reach only U.S. $200,000.
Conversely, if the U.S. carrier has adopted the second option
(i.e., waiver plus the law of the passenger's domicile), the
amount of damages recoverable by the family of the Italian student will always be U.S. $200,000 no matter where the suit is
brought. Since the right to invoke the limitation has been
waived, and the law applicable to determine the recoverable
damages is the law of the passenger's domicile, the amount recovered will always be more or less the same, around U.S.
ity Regime: The End of Airline Limited Liability (Apr. 17, 1997) [hereinafter
Conference].
68 In the example, Article 28 does not allow the family of the Italian student to
bring suit in Italy, because the place of destination was Washington, the ticket was
purchased in the United States, and the carrier is from the United States.
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$200,000 depending on the competency of the court applying
Italian law.
The practical difference between the two options is obvious.
By not specifying the law of the passenger's domicile as the law
applicable for determining the damages, the "unconditional
waiver" would not in any way be limited, and medium and smallsize airlines could expect a significant increase in compensation
awards if plaintiffs-increasingly file suit in high-damage-award
countries like the United States. This is contrary to the purpose
of the "waiver plus the law of the passenger's domicile" rule,
which was designed to protect carriers from suits brought in
high-award jurisdictions with little or no connection to the controversy. No matter where the suit is brought, the recoverable
damages should always be approximately the same. Additionally, this second option serves the purpose of guaranteeing each
passenger a level of damage compensation corresponding to the
economic standards and the law of his or her domicile.
When the time came to implement the IIA and find the appropriate provisions to be inserted in the conditions of carriage
of the signatories, IATA decided to take a road that would run
somewhere in between the first and the second option.
B.

THE

1996

MIAMI AGREEMENT

Since the IIA was only a statement of purpose, IATA formulated a second agreement in 1996, the Agreement on Measures
to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, often referred
to as the Miami Intercarrier Agreement (MIA) ,69 as it was
drafted in Miami.
Although airlines still maintain some discretion with their implementation of the MIA, the MIA adopted more definitive solutions and closed some of the options that the IIA had left open.
This is evidenced, for example, by the inclusion in the MIA of
two mandatory provisions that the signatory carriers agreed to
incorporate in their conditions of carriage and tariffs, and three
optional provisions which, at the option of each carrier, may
also be included in its conditions of carriage and tariffs. The
following discussion examines the MIA by using such a
distinction.
6" IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, opened for signature May 1996 [hereinafter MIA], reprinted in 21 AIR &
SPACE L. 90 (1996).
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Mandatory Provisions

In Section I of the MIA, the undersigned carriers agree to
implement the IIA by incorporating in their conditions of carriage and tariffs, where necessary, the following:
1. (CARRIER) shall not invoke the limitation of liability in Article
22(1) of the Convention as to any claim for recoverable compensatory damages arising under Article 17 of the Convention.
2. (CARRIER) shall not avail itself of any defense under Article
20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such
claim which does not exceed 100,000 SDRs [unless option 11(2)
is used].
3. Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof,
(CARRIER) reserves all defenses available under the Convention
to any such claim. With respect to third parties, the carrier also
reserves all rights of recourse against any other person, including
70
without limitation, rights of contribution and indemnity.
Paragraph 1 represents the entire waiver of the limitation of
liability of Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention as amended
by the 1955 Hague Protocol. Contrary to the IIA, the MIA mandates that airlines waive the limit in all circumstances (i.e., unconditional waiver). However, as discussed below, the MIA also
allows, but does not require, the airline to agree to the application of the law of the passenger's domicile. Accordingly, and
only to the extent a carrier does so, the carrier adopts the abovementioned waiver plus the law of the passenger's domicile
option.
The waiver was also limited since it refers only to claims for
"compensatory damages," and, accordingly, does not apply to
claims for punitive and non-physical damages. As a consequence of this waiver, the signatories also rendered meaningless
the Article 25 willful misconduct exception, which represented
the most popular instrument for victims to avoid the limitation
on liability and thus became the principal reason for prolonged
and expensive litigation.
In paragraph 2, the MIA also mandates the waiver of the Article 20(1) defense with respect to the portion of the claim which
does not exceed SDR 100,000. 7 1 By waiving this defense, signatory airlines that have properly revised their conditions of carId. § I.
As discussed above, the IIA, on the other hand, did not specify a particular
amount and left to the discretion of the signatory airlines the waiver of any defense provided by Warsaw.
70

71

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

riage and tariffs will be liable notwithstanding the absence of
fault (i.e., absolute liability) at least up to SDR 100,000 (approximately U.S. $150,000). The Article 20(1) defense will, however,
apply for claims above SDR 100,000.2
Because of this new two-tier system based on absolute liability
up to SDR 100,000 and presumed fault with no limit, if it were
established, for example, that the TWA 800 disaster was caused
by a missile for which no one could claim TWA's negligence, it
would ensure that the families of victims would receive at least
some monetary recovery.7 3
Paragraph 3 reserves all other defenses available under the
Convention, and in particular reserves to the carrier all rights of
recourse against others, like rights of contribution and indemnity. Although some doubts have been raised," this provision
was included to make certain that an airline that had to pay
compensation to a passenger did not waive its right to receive
contribution or indemnification from third parties, i.e., the
manufacturers or the air traffic control authorities.
2.

Optional Provisions

Section II of the MIA states:
At the option of the carrier, its conditions of carriage and tariffs also may include the following provisions:
72 It is only fair to mention that airlines have so far almost never been able to
use the Article 20(1) defense by proving that they had taken "all necessary measures." This may change, however, when recoveries are unlimited and airlines,
therefore, have a much more pressing incentive to prove non-negligence.
73 See Mendelsohn, supra note 52, at 1074.
74 See Lee S. Kreindler, Goodbye to Liability Limitations, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1997, at
3.
If the plaintiff can just get his or her money from the airline, it is
then open, according to the proponents of the IATA Agreements,
for the airlines or their insurers to try to get contribution or indemnification from the manufacturers. This seems questionable, however. The Intercarrier Agreement under which the airline will pay
unlimited amounts does not constitute law, or a legal judgment. It
is primarily a contract among the airlines ... , although it is partly
law.... If the manufacturer wants to contest its liability for contribution or indemnification, it will claim that the airline that paid the
plaintiff was a volunteer, and, as such, has no effective recourse
against the manufacturer. The plaintiff can make a similar claim if
he or she separately sues the manufacturer, claiming that the manufacturer is not entitled to a set off for what the airline paid.
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1. (CARRIER) agrees that subject to applicable law, recoverable
compensatory damages for such claims may be determined by
reference to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of
the passenger.
2. (CARRIER) shall not avail itself of any defense under Article
20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such
claim which does not exceed 100,000 SDRs, except that such
waiver is limited to the amounts shown below for the routes indicated, as may be authorized by governments concerned with the
transportation involved.
3. Neither the waiver of limits nor the waiver of defenses shall be
applicable in respect of claims made by public social insurance or
similar bodies however asserted. Such claims shall be subject to
the limit in Article 22(1) and to the defenses under Article 20(1)
of the Convention. The carrier will compensate the passenger or
his dependents for recoverable compensatory damages in excess
of payments
received from any public social insurance or similar
75
body.

The provision in paragraph 1 is certainly the most important
of the three provisions contained in section II. Even though on
a voluntary basis, the MIA provides that recoverable compensatory damages may be determined by reference to the law of the
domicile of the passenger. As a consequence, and depending
on whether an airline includes such a provision in its conditions
of carriage, the two main options of the IIA appear still to be
found in the MIA: (a) "unconditional waiver," and (b) "waiver
plus the law of the passenger's domicile."7 6
It is important to stress that if "waiver b" is included in the
conditions of carriage and tariffs of a carrier, the application of
the law of the passenger's domicile would not be mandatory.
The use of the expression "may be determined" clearly emphasizes the non-mandatory connotation of the provision. This
would leave open the question whether the decision to apply the
law of the domicile rests with the passenger, the carrier, or the
court. Although such choice in the first instance should be up
to the passenger claimant, it will ultimately be up to the court to
77
decide which law to apply.
MIA, supra note 69, at § II.
Id.
77 See Order to Show Cause, issued by the Department of Transportation on Oct.
31, 1996, at 5 n.7. The DOT's interpretation would also accord with the problem
said to be caused by Article 32 and the presumed infringement of the rules of the
Convention. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
75

76
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The "Fifth-Forum"Provision

Following an effort by the United States to change the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention in order to protect the
so-called "wandering American" from the unfairness of being
forced to seek compensation in a foreign court, it was suggested
that the airlines could, by special agreement, include the domicile of the passenger as a fifth basis ofjurisdiction in their conditions of carriage, which would be added to the four (or three) 78
fora already included in Article 28 of the Convention.
It was argued, for example, that airlines could add the domicile of the passenger as the fifth forum simply by inserting a
provision in their conditions of carriage that would deem the
contract to have been made through a place of business in the
passenger's country of domicile.7 ' Another solution was proposed by the Air Transport Association (ATA) at the IATA meeting in Montreal in April 1996, when IATA was trying to reach an
agreement to implement the IIA. The ATA proposed the inclusion of a provision in the IIA's implementation-agreement by
which carriers would have agreed to permit cases to be brought
in the passenger's domicile.8" Nevertheless, because of the fear
of non-U.S. airlines of U.S. jury awards, none of these efforts has
been successful to date, 8' and the "wandering American," like
the wondering German, British, and Italian, is still wandering
82
even under the new IIA-MIA system.

71 See supra note 13.

79 See Bin Cheng, A Fifth Jurisdiction Without Montreal Additional Protocol No. 3,
and Full Compensation Without the Supplemental Compensation Plan, 20 AIR & SPACE
L. 118 (1995).
8) See Warren Dean, Remarks at the International Air Transport Association
Legal Symposium 97 (Feb. 3, 1997) (unpublished manuscript at 4, on file with
the authors).
8 The ATA proposal was not agreed to at the Montreal meeting, even for inclusion in the MIA on an optional basis, and it was therefore withdrawn from the
text that became the IPA, as filed with the Department of Transportation. See id.
at 4.
82 Those who argued against the fifth forum did so because it would only benefit the "wandering American." However, this ignores the fact that there are many
other people (or survivors) of all nationalities who might not be able to sue at
home under Article 28, but who could do so if the fifth forum was adopted. See
Mendelsohn, supra note 52, at 1077-78.
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Compatibility of the IATA Agreements With the Warsaw
Convention

4.

Since the IIA and MIA are only "contracts between airlines,"
an important question that arises regarding both the mandatory
and optional provisions of the MIA is their compatibility with
the Warsaw Convention particularly with Article 32, which provides that:
any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements
entered into before the damage occurred by which the parties
purport to infringe the rules laid down by this convention,
whether by deciding the law to be applied83or by altering the rules
as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
The object of Article 32 is to ban any infringement of the
rules provided for by the Convention, especially those designed
to protect the passenger's rights. Accordingly, Article 32 would
nullify both any contractual clause which directly violates (i.e.,
"infringes" upon, a specific rule of the Convention ("direct infringement")), and also any contractual clause by which the carier might attempt to circumvent the provisions of the liability
system set out in the Convention, or, in other words, lessen its
liability (indirect infringement).
We will analyze the question of the MIA's compatibility with
Article 32 of each of the following MIA provisions: (a) the
waiver of the liability limit (mandatory); (b) the law applicable
to the determination of the damages (optional); and (c) the
fifth forum provision (excluded).
(a) The provisions of section I of the MIA do not conflict with
any of the provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended by
the Hague Protocol. In particular, the carrier and the passenger
are entitled to agree to a higher liability limit both by an express
provision in Article 22(1)84 and implicitly by Article 23.85 The
ban provided for in Article 32 regarding "any clause by which
the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this convention" does not apply since there is clearly no infringement.8 6
83

Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32.

84 Article 22, paragraph 1, states that, "by special contract, the carrier and the

1.
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Id. at art. 22,
85 Article 23 provides that "any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this convention shall be
null and void .... ." Id. at art. 23.
86 The scope of Article 32, as discussed later, seems limited to choice of law
and choice of forum clauses. See infra note 88-97 and accompanying text for
discussion.
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Additionally, the waiver of the liability limit would certainly accord with the Warsaw Convention's purpose of protecting passenger's rights.
(b) The question of the compatibility with Article 32 of the
applicable law clause relating to the determination of damages
is more complicated. Since the Convention does not have
either a general conflict of laws rule relating to the applicable
law or a provision that specifies how damages are to be determined, a lex domicilii clause does not seem to "directly" violate
any provision of the Convention.
On the other hand, a lex domicilii clause, like the one found in
the MIA, could "indirectly" infringe the rules laid down by the
Convention by lessening the rights of the passenger as guaranteed by the Convention.8 7 An argument could be made that a
contractual clause providing for the law of the passenger's domicile as the applicable law for damages may lessen the rights of
the passenger, and thus "indirectly" infringe the rules of the
Convention. This could happen if the damages law of the passenger's domicile is less favorable than the law of damages in
the state where suit is brought or the accident occurred. For
example, where lex domicilii provides for only actual damages
and not (or to a lesser extent) for damages for pain and suffering in case of death, then by mandating the application of lex
domicilii, where a more favorable lex foi or lex loci delicti is available, a carrier is indeed lessening its liability and thus infringing
the Convention.
Although this argument has some basis, especially where the
lex domicilii clause would apply mandatorily, we doubt that such
a clause would be an infringement of the rules of the Convention. In fact, the clause in the MIA that provides for the law of
the domicile does not constitute an attempt at circumventing
the liability regime of the Warsaw Convention or lessening the
rights of the passenger. The law of the domicile is used only to
determine the amount of damages to be awarded, and nothing
in the Convention specifically precludes the adoption of lex
domicilii.8 8

87 Article 32, in fact, also has to be interpreted as a "protective mechanism."
Under this perspective, its purpose is to make sure that the rights of the passengers are not lessened below the level guaranteed by the Convention.
88 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Domicile and The Warsaw System, 22 ANNALS AIR &
SPACF L. 137, 143-44 (1997).
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Moreover, application of a law of damages less favorable to
the plaintiff could and may well occur even without a lex domicilii
clause. After all, many courts have concluded, even without a lex
domicilii clause, that the law of the victim's domicile is the most
appropriate law to apply when determining a victim's
damages.89
Further, even if a "law of the domicile choice of law clause" is
included in the conditions of carriage and tariffs of the relevant
carrier, the application of the law of the passenger's domicile
would not be mandatory. 90 Accordingly, the clause by itself
would not lessen the carrier's liability and thus would not constitute an infringement of the Convention's rules. For the above
mentioned reasons, it seems that Article 32 does not bar the
inclusion in the carriage conditions of a provision from which
damages may be determined by reference to the law of the passenger's domicile.
(c) One of the reasons why the signatories refused to consent
to the contractual fifth basis ofjurisdiction was that such a provision would arguably violate the Convention's Article 32. As has
been distinctly concluded by two experts in the field of international aviation law, however, the contractual fifth forum does
not violate Article 32. 9 1 Although it is true that the rules as to
jurisdiction are altered by adopting a fifth forum or fori domicilii
by special agreement, it is also true that "when we do so, we are
not infringing the rules laid down by the convention."92
The inclusion of the fifth basis of jurisdiction does not appear
to be a "direct infringement" of the rules of the Convention,
since the foni domiciliiwould only be added to the other four fora
of Article 28." Such an "addition" obviously cannot be considered as an "infringement" for purposes of Article 32. This can
be concluded from a careful reading of the original text of the
Convention. Instead of the English word "infringe," the French
text employs the word "derogeraient," which means "derogate
from," thus presumptively allowing a mere addition.94
89 See id.
90 The use of the phrase "may be determined" clearly emphasizes the nonmandatory connotation of the provision. See id.
91 See Mendelsohn, supra note 52, at 1075-76; see also Warren Dean, Restructuring the Warsaw Right to Recover, 1089 AvIATION L. REP. 19,151, 19,155-56 (1996).
92 Mendelsohn, supra note 52 at 1076.
93 See id.
94 Id.
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Moreover, the fori domicilii clause does not appear to be an
"indirect infringement," either. Once again, the addition of the
fifth forum would generally not constitute a lessening of the carrier's liability or the passenger's rights. As Professor Mendelsohn states, "[a] dopting a fifth forum would not violate Article
32 because there is no infringement; there is no derogation.
You are adding something that is a real benefit to passengers.
You are enhancing the rights and the benefits that passengers
enjoy under the Convention.""
Nevertheless, a domicile fifth forum would be barred by Article 32 if it leads to a forum that (a) is not a party to Warsaw and
(b) lessens the carrier's liability. Such an interpretation accords
with the purpose of Article 32. As stated above, Article 32 is a
defensive mechanism for the protection of passenger rights. Its
purpose is to nullify any attempt by carriers to circumvent the
provisions of the liability system set out in the Convention. For
example, by attributing jurisdiction to the courts of a particular
country (the passenger's domicile) that does not adhere to the
Warsaw Convention, and whose laws provide for a U.S. $5000
liability limitation, a carrier would lessen its liability and, thus,
infringe the rules laid down by the Convention. To be sure, it is
the passenger (or the survivors) who opt for the forum; and it is
unlikely that they would opt for a forum where Warsaw and the
advantages of the MIA might not be applicable.
What if the fori domicilii were to be adopted under the MIA as
the sole and exclusive forum available for plaintiffs? The adoption of an exclusive forum selection clause would give sole jurisdiction to the courts of the passenger's domicile. This would
result in excluding the other fora provided for in Article 28 and
would be void per se under Article 32 as a "direct infringement"
of the rules of the Convention. An alteration of the rules regarding jurisdiction would not ipso facto constitute an infringement. However, an exclusive forum selection clause would be
an infringement because it would derogate from Article 28.
In summary, the inclusion of a clause providing for for/
domicilii as the fifth basis of jurisdiction would not be barred by
Article 32 of Warsaw if it is added as an additional and nonexclusive forum. 6 It would be void, however, if it were included as
95

Id.

See BALLARINO & BUSTI, supra note 34, at 686. The authors argue that both
the governments and the parties may not either add to or derogate from the four
jurisdictions of Article 28.
96
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the exclusive forum or if it has the effect of infringing the rules
laid down by the Warsaw Convention as a protection of the
rights of the passengers (i.e., by lessening the carrier's
liability).

C.

THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION

As of 16th February, 1999, 120 carriers had signed the IIA. Of
those, eighty-eighty had also signed the MIA.98 Questions have
arisen since the agreements were drafted. These include: Are
the agreements binding on the signatory airlines; Must there be
some form of actual implementation, if so, what form of implementation is required?
It seems that airlines are not legally bound by simply signing
both the IATA Agreements. In order to render the IATA Agreements effective, an airline would have to modify its conditions of
carriage according to the provisions set out in the MIA. 99 This is
what the Japanese airlines did following their 1992 decision to
adopt the two-tier system. This is also what some European airlines did after a declaration in November 1996 that they would
not apply the Warsaw Convention limitation on liability.
All major U.S. international airlines have modified their conditions of carriage to the MIA. They have, in fact, drafted and
signed a third agreement, called "Provisions Implementing the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in Conditions of
Carriage and Tariffs" (IPA),1 00 and also filed appropriate tariffs
with the U.S. DOT. As a consequence, the two-tier system is already in effect on all international flights of the large U.S. airlines. Under the DOT's order, the U.S. airlines have adopted
the "waiver plus the law of the passenger's domicile" option
under the MIA. 10 1
As of April 1998, forty-nine carriers, including thirteen U.S.
airlines, are reported to have effectively waived the liability limits
97 This would happen if, as a consequence of enforcing a fifth-forum clause,
the level of protection provided by the Warsaw Convention (presumed liability
limited to the equivalent of U.S. $8300 or $16,600) is not afforded to the passenger. See id.
98 See List of Carriers Signatory to the IIA and MIA (visited on Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://www.iata.org/legal/index.htm>.
- It is true, however, that the new text does not have to appear on the passenger's ticket to be binding. See MIA, supra note 69.
100 For a discussion of the IPA, see Dean, supra note 80.
10, The liability limitation will disappear and the damages will be determined
by reference to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of the passenger.
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provided for by the Warsaw Convention (i.e., modifying their
conditions of carriage).11

2

Among them, however, only Air Can-

ada, Canadian International, Air France, Avianca, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Lufthansa, Korean Airlines, Malaysian
Airlines System, Swissair, Belair and Crossair, Scandanavian, Singapore Airlines, Japan Air Lines, New Zealand Airlines have also
filed tariffs with the U.S. DOT.' °3 A number of foreign carriers
have declared that they have adopted the MIA, but they have
not filed tariffs with the U.S. DOT nor shown evidence that they
have modified their conditions of carriage. 0 4 This situation is
confusing, particularly for passengers who might take several airlines on an international journey. Moreover, there are certain
areas of the world (i.e., South America, the Carribean, Africa,
and the Middle East), where few, if any, carriers have adopted
1 5
the MIA or filed tariffs with the U.S. DOT.
IV.

THE REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In December 1995, just after the IIA was agreed upon in Kuala Lumpur, the Commission of the European Union, pursuant
to the EU legislative "cooperation" procedure, drafted a proposal for a Council Regulation on air carrier liability' 0 6 The proposal, like the IATA initiative, purports to waive all monetary limits
of liability set by the Warsaw Convention. After almost two years
of intense labor, the Council adopted the proposal on October
9, 1997. The regulation was published in the Official Journal of
the European Communities on October 17, 1997, and pursuant

102 The list also includes five Japanese air carriers which have not signed the
MIA, and other small airlines which have not signed either the IIA or the MIA
(British Midland, British Regional Airlines, Loganair, Manx Airlines, Tower Air).
Unofficial list given to the authors by the IATA Legal Department. This list does
not take into account the effect of the EC Regulation 2027/97. See infra note 108
and accompanying text.
103 The U.S. DOT reportedly requires the filing of a tariff in order to constitute
evidence that the two-tier system is effectively in place. Five of the carriers among
the 49 are Japanese and presumably filed tariffs when they originally adopted the
two-tier system in 1992.
104 Among those are Asiana, Austrian,
British Midland, British Regional,
Finair, GB Airways, Icelandic, KLM, Lauda Air, Loganair, Martinair, Manx Airlines, Maersk Air, Quantas, Royal Air Maroc, SAS, Singapore, and Transavia. See
id.
105 See id.
106 See EC Proposal, supra note 40.
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to Article 8 of the Regulation, came into force on October 17,

1998. 107
As is evidenced in the Explanatory Memorandum included in
the proposal, the principal intent of the Commission was to
achieve, at least within the European Community, a uniform
and fair system of liability.10 8 After introducing the subject of air
carrier liability, the Commission states the following:
It is against this background of low limits and a risk not only to
the unity of the Community aviation market, but also to the protection of air transport users that the Commission is of the opinion that Community action should be undertaken in order to
establish an acceptable situation for the air transport sector by
ensuring common rules for liability in the terms and conditions
of carriage irrespective of the nature of the operation and by
guaranteeing a fair situation for air transport users.10 9
In the following paragraphs, we will analyze the content of the
Regulation, keeping in mind the similarities and differences
with the IATA initiative. We will also comment on the legislative
evolution of the proposal, which has lasted almost two years.

A.

THE CONTENT OF THE

EU

REGULATION

The Regulation resembles, but also differs from, the IATA
Agreements in several respects. The most important similar features of the regulation are the following:
(a) the introduction of a two-tier system;
(b) the removal of any limit of liability (Article 3(1) (a));
(c) absolute liability up to the equivalent in ECU of SDR 100,000
(Article 3(2));
(d) presumed liability above the equivalent in ECU of SDR
100,000 (i.e., the airline can invoke its defenses under Article
20 (1) of the Convention, i.e., that it took all possible measures to
prevent the damage from occurring);
(e) airlines retain the right to seek contribution or indemnity
from any other party (Article 4). l1 °
This is the same two-tier system of unlimited and absolute (up
to a certain level) liability that was introduced for the first time
107 See Council Regulation 2027/97 of Oct. 1997, O.J. (L 285) 1 [hereinafter
EC Regulation].

108 See id.
109 Id.
110 Common

Position (EC) No. 197, art. 3-4 (adopted by the Council on Feb.
24, 1997) available in Interinstitutional File No. 95/0359 (SYN) [hereinafter
Common Position].
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in international air transport by the Japanese airlines in 1992.
This was then followed by IATA in its two Intercarrier Agreements in 1995 and 1996.
On the other hand, there are several important features of
the Regulation that differ from, or were not included in, the
IATA Agreements:
(a) mandatory applicability to all EU airlines instead of the
voluntary applicability of the MIA;
(b) applicability of the Regulation to all national and international flights of all EU airlines, whereas the MIA is only applicable to international flights (Article 1);
(c) applicability of the Regulation only to community air carriers (Articles 1-2);11

(d) mandatory up-front payment of the equivalent in ECU of
SDR 15,000 to the family of a victim in case of death (Article
5);12

(e) information obligations imposed on all air carriers, operating in the European Union (Article 6)."'
The above provisions, which were not included in the IATA
Agreements, are designed to improve the uniformity and fairness of the liability regime. The provisions relating to
mandatory applicability and the applicability to both domestic
and international flights evidence the pursuit of a uniform regime, at least within the European Union. The Articles relating
to the advance-payment and the notice requirement are intended to provide additional protections for victims and their
families.
It is important to mention that, unlike the IATA initiative, the
applicability of the lex domicilii to determine damages was never
even considered by the Commission, the Parliament, or the
Council. As will be discussed below, the lack of a lex domicilii
provision will not only constitute a problematic difference between the EU and the IATA regimes, but will also represent an
incentive for forum shopping.
", The U.S. Department of Transportation, for example, made certain that all
carriers operating to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United
States, adhered to the 1966 Montreal Agreement. See LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at
7-102.
112 Most scholars seem to view this proposal as highly impracticable. See Martin, Update, supra note 57, at 127; Berend Crans & Onno Rijsdijk, EC Aviation
Scene, 21 Am & SPACE L. 193, 194-95 (1996).
11- See EC Proposal, supra note 40.

1999]

B.

IATA AGREEMENTS/EUROPEAN REGULATION

Wi-Y A SEPARATE

409

EU PROPOSAL WHEN THE KuALx LUMPUR

AcREEMENT WAS ALREADY ADOPTED?

There are at least two sound explanations why the Commission presented its own proposal even after the IIA was signed.
First, the Commission's interest in the modernization of the air
carrier liability regime provided for by the Warsaw Convention
did not result exclusively because of the IIA. In fact, the Commission's intent to improve the Warsaw system can be traced
back to 1989, when it commissioned a study in order to have a
full account of the state of ratification, legislation, and practices
in the field of air carrier liability in the Member States as well as
in other countries. The results of that analysis led in March
1991 to a preliminary study on the "Possibilities of Community
action to harmonize limits of passenger liability and increase the
amounts of compensation for international accident victims in
air transport."1 1 4 A Consultation Paper was then issued in 1992
by the Commission entitled "Passenger liability in aircraft accidents-Warsaw Convention and Internal Market Requirements,"
which was followed by a "round table" with Member States and
interested parties in March 1993, and another study on the cost
implications of different limits in February 1994.115
A second reason explaining the drafting of the proposal after
the IIA was signed was that the Commission was reportedly skeptical of the success of the IATA initiative, mainly due to the fact

that the initiative was based on a voluntary agreement. Why
would European carriers sign the IIA/MIA while the Warsaw
System still covers their international routes? Why would they
waive their defenses up to U.S. $150,000? Why should they accept unlimited liability? The Commission did not wish to wait
for answers to these questions or to see whether the MIA would
be successful among European carriers. When the Commission
issued its proposal, only Austrian Airlines, KLM, SAS and Swissair had signed the IIA." 6 Hence, the Commission states in its
Explanatory Memorandum to the initial proposal of December,
1995:
The intercarrier agreement is a minimum common denominator. If carriers acting on a voluntary basis, or obliged by their
governments, would like to offer more, they would be able to do
114 Study delivered on 15 September 1991 by Sven Brise, consultant. EC Proposal, supra note 40, § 10.
115 See id. § 11.
116 See id. § 12.

410

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

so. The signing carriers will have to implement the provisions of
the agreement no later than 1 November 1996 .... [T]he effectiveness of the agreement will depend on the degree of participation by airlines. At the moment, as indicated earlier, only certain
Community carriers have signed. Without the agreement of all
Community air carriers, the risks of differing standards and thus
fragmentation of the internal aviation market will not only subsist, but may increase. Thus the situation for the air user would
become more confusing. 17
For the above mentioned reasons, the Commission decided
that a Council regulation would be the best way to quickly
achieve the desired results: adequate protection of Community
air passengers in case of accidents and simplification of an
overly complex system for Community air carriers.
Nevertheless, during the legislative process in Brussels, both
the IIA and the MIA appeared to be reasonably successful
(although only a few airlines effectively implemented the MIA in
their conditions of carriage).' 1S While the Commission's decision to pursue the proposal may seem strange, it is understandable. It could have taken an extended period of time before all
community air carriers implemented the MIA in their conditions of carriage. Additionally, the Commission wanted to assure that all air travel within the Community was regulated by
one standard, regardless of the preferences of the airline or
whether or not the flights were international. Such a result was
not guaranteed under the IIA/MIA regime, since both Agreements only applied to international flights and left several options open for the individual airline to decide.
Moreover, as evidenced in both the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission and the Opinion of the Economic and
Social Committee, the proposed Regulation was seen by the EU
community as an opportunity to influence the future drafting of
a possible new multilateral Convention that would replace or
amend the Warsaw Convention. 1 9 In the words of the Economic and Social Committee, the questions relating to the modification of the airline's liability system "need to be addressed
with a view that the final regulation will act as a catalyst for a
Id. at §§ 13-14.
118 By 31 July 1996, the 11A had been signed by 56 international airlines and 24
of them signed the MIA. See IATA Press Release of 31 July 1996, No. 13 (visited
on Mar. 9, 1999) <http://www.iata.org>.
119 See EC Proposal, supra note 40.
117
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world-wide system for the benefit of the
new, more appropriate
120
traveling public."
C.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE

EU

REGULATION

History of the Legislative "Cooperation" Procedure of the
Regulation

1.

The proposal followed the European Union legislative "cooperation" procedure pursuant to Article 189c (d) of the EC
Treaty. 12 1 It was drafted by the Commission in December 1995,
and subsequently transmitted to the Council of (Transport)
Ministers (the Council) in February 1996.122 The Council sub-

mitted the proposal to the Economic and Social Committee and
the European Parliament, which gave their opinions on the proposal and the amendments in May and September 1996, respectively.' 23 An amended proposal, which took into consideration
several of the suggestions and amendments proposed by the
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament,
was submitted to the Council in December, 1996.124 On Febru-

ary 24, 1997, the Council adopted a so-called Common Position
on the proposal. 2 5 The proposal was then sent to the Parliament for a "second reading." The European Parliament, during
its plenary session on May 29, 1997, approved the Common Posi126
tion and adopted several textual amendments to the text.
The Commission accepted the amendments and, in July 1997,
120 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a
Council Regulation (EC) on Air Carrier Liability in Case of Air Accidents," 1996
3.2 [hereinafter Opinion]. Similarly, the Commission stated in its
OJ. (C 212)
Explanatory Memorandum that the Community action must be seen as a measure that will help to trigger existing international Conventions. By adopting the
Regulation, the Community will act as a catalyst together with similar moves in
Japan and the USA. In any event, the Community and the Member States should
in cooperation with ECAC use all its efforts in order to urge the appropriate
international forum-ICAO-to update the current international instruments

into force. EC Proposal, Explanatory Memo, supra note 40, § 15.
121 See EC Regulation, supra note 107.
122

See id.

123

See Opinion, supra note 120, at 38; and Opinion of the European Parlia-

ment of 17 Sept. 1996, 1996 OJ. (C 320) 30.
124

See Official Journal of the European Communities, Amended Commission

Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Air Carrier Liability in Case of Accidents, COM(06)663 final at 10 (1997) [hereinafter Amended EC Proposal].
125 See Common Position, supra note 110, at 87.
126 See Decision of the European Parliament of 29 May 1997, 1997 OJ. (C 182)
1 [hereinafter Decision].
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forwarded a revised proposal to the Council for final adoption. 127 The Council adopted the proposal on October 9, 1997.
2. Evolution of Several Provisions of the Regulation
Apart from changing some numbers in the proposal, the contents of the Regulation relating to the two-tier system are much
the same today as when the Commission first issued it in December 1995. 2" There are, however, several provisions relating to
an airline's liability that were modified or amended during the
two-year legislative process that are worth mentioning.
a.

Advance Payment.

Article 4 of the original 1995 proposal related to the "advance
payment provision."' 29 It provided that the carrier, not later
than ten days after an accident, pay to "the person entitled to
compensation a lump sum of up to ECU 50,000 and in any event
a sum of ECU 50,000 in case of death."' 0 Following criticism
from both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee regarding the "unworkability" of the lump sum
scheme,' 3 ' the Commission amended Article 4. Introducing

more flexibility into the advance payment provisions, the Commission provided that the carrier, "not later than ten days after
the identity of the person entitled to compensation has been
established, make such advance payments as may be required to
meet immediate economic needs."' 3 2

Subsequently, in the

Council's common position, the ten days were raised to fifteen
days "since ten days was not considered enough time to gather
all the necessary elements to make the payments."'13

'

A mini-

mum amount of compensation in case of death (SDR 15,000roughly the equivalent of ECU 15,000) was also added "in order
to provide a higher level of protection for those entitled to re127 See id. EU regulations are similar in form to administrative regulations commonly found in North America; see generally RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 38 (2d ed. 1995).
128 The level of strict liability, for example, was increased from ECU 100,000 to
ECU 120,000. See Amended EC Proposal, supra note 124, at 9.
129 EC Proposal, supra note 40, at 19.
130 Id.
131 "[T]hc Committee is concerned that the proposal will be unworkable unless it is clear as to how certain difficulties will be met. For example, it can take
time to identify victims and trace relatives. There may be difficulties in establishing who is entitled to payments." Opinion, supra note 120, at 39.
132 Amended EC Proposal, supra note 124, at 10.
1-4-Common Position, supra note 110.
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Moreover, the requirement that the payment be

non-refundable, first introduced in the Commission's original
proposal, was modified in order to take into account cases
where, for example, the negligence of the injured or deceased
passenger, the negligence of the person who received the advance payment, or a mistake in the identification of the person
entitled to compensation, were proven. 135 The European Parliament fully accepted the changes in its "second reading."
Adequate Information

b.

Article 5 of the original proposal included obligations to provide information to passengers for both Community and nonCommunity air carriers. 1 6 Paragraph 1 provided that requirements relating to the waiver of liability limits and advance payment had to be included in the conditions of carriage of all
Community air carriers. 13 Paragraphs 2 and 3, respectively,
specified under somewhat different terms that Community and
non-Community carriers provide on request "adequate information" to passengers. 3 Paragraph 3 noted that "the fact that the
limit is indicated on the ticket document does not constitute
sufficient information."'3 9 Although the Economic and Social
Committee voiced criticism about the difficulties of enforcing
this requirement on non-Community carriers,"' 0 the European
Parliament accepted the provision without any significant
changes, as did the Council in its Common Position. However,
in order to provide necessary consumer protection, the Council
imposed an additional burden on third-country air carriers by
creating an obligation to provide the passenger with a form setting out their conditions."' The provision was not well accepted by either non-Community airlines or legal
commentators, who, like the Economic and Social Committee,
and disthought that such requirements could cause confusion
2
uniformity and could be difficult to enforce."'
-4 See Statement of the Council's Reasons of 26.2.1997 attached to the Common Position, supra note 110.
135See id.
136

See EC Proposal, supra note 40, at 19, 20.
id.

137 See
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See
141
142

Opinion, supra note 120, at 40.
See Common Position, supra note 110, at 91.
See Opinion, supra note 120, at 20.
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At the "second reading," the European Parliament took the
comments into account and amended Article 6.143 First, the European Parliament eliminated the difference between Community and non-Community airlines. This abolished the need for
several different notices attached to the ticket, a system burdensome on the airlines and confusing to passengers. 4 4 Second,
the "duty of information" could be satisfied by simply indicating
the airlines' liability schedule on the passenger's ticket.14 5 Accordingly, paragraphs 2 and 3 stated that "the liability regime
applied by an air carrier shall be clearly set out in its conditions
of carriage and shall be made available to passengers at the air
carrier's agencies, travel agencies, check-in counters and points
of sale," and "the ticket document or an equivalent shall refer to
the liability regime and make clear where the detailed conditions of carriage can be obtained."1 4' 6 Notwithstanding the Commission acceptance, the Council has not taken into account the
changes suggested by the Parliament and adopted the previous
version of Article 6.147
c.

Fifth-Forum

The original proposal also contained a critically important
provision that allowed victims or their descendants to commence proceedings in the Member State where they are domiciled. The Explanatory Memorandum stated the following
about this critical provision:
Passengers should have the choice of the jurisdiction before
which to bring an action. It should include an option to bring an
action before the court of the Member State where the passenger
has his domicile. This might circumvent the possibilities of confusion that8 might arise when referring to the law of the
14
domicile.
The Economic and Social Committee welcomed the addition
of the fori domicilii to the four specified by Article 28 of the War-

145

See Decision, supra note 126.
See id.
See id.

146

Id.

143
144

147See EC Regulation, supra note 107.
148 EC Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, supranote 40, at 7. The reference to
the law of the domicile seemed to suggest a favor for the application of the lex
domicilii. With the deletion of the fifth-forum provision, however, the conflict of
laws issue was also abandoned.
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saw Convention. 49 Commentators in the United States also received the addition with enthusiasm. 150 Unfortunately, the
"fifth forum" provision was then deleted by the Council from its
Common Position of February, 1997.15' The Council explained
its deletion by stating that Article 7 was "deemed to raise very
complex legal and factual issues which would have to be resolved before settling the claim" 152 and "the other four jurisdictions provided pursuant to the Warsaw Convention were
sufficient."1 53 There is no readily available proof to substantiate
the official explanation for deleting the fifth forum. The deletion was probably not so much a result of superior intellect at
the Council level as the result of successful lobbying in Brussels
by the Community carriers that were apprehensive about the
possibility of excessive litigation in different member states after
an accident. Unfortunately, the Commission and the European
Parliament backed down and did not try to restore what was
once a "welcomed" and "appropriate" provision. Both appeared
to supinely accept the Council's amendment in its entirety.
d. Applicability to Non-EU Carriers
While the Commission decided against applying the regulation to third-country airlines,1 54 the concern about uniformity of
the liability system in case of an accident became an issue in the
regulation's legislative process of the Regulation. Following an
amendment that the European Parliament adopted at its "first
reading," the Commission inserted into the proposal a recital
and an article providing for the introduction in future civil aviation negotiations with third-countries of a commitment to apply
the Regulation. 5 5 In the Common Position adopted by the
Council, however, both the recital and article were deleted because they referred to matters "outside the scope of the regulaSee Opinion, supra note 120, at 18.
150 See Mendelsohn, supra note 52, at 1077.
15,See Common Position, supra note 110, at 94.
152 Id.
149

153 Id. at

95.

Applicability to all carriers operating to or from the European Union would
actually have been a logical step towards uniformity of the legal consequences of
an accident in the European Union. However, the Council's "proposal [aimed]
at improving the level of protection of passengers involved in air accidents on
board a Community air carrier." Common Position, supra note 110, at 92. The
Council did not seem to care about Community passengers who suffered injury
or death on board non-Community air carriers, but did not state its reasons.
155 See Amended EC Proposal, supra note 124, at 12, 15.
154
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tion." 156 However, showing a tenacity that many would like to
have seen for the "fifth forum" provision, the European Parlia-

ment reintroduced those provisions at a "second reading" in a
57
new Article 7a, and they were accepted by the Commission.1
The final version adopted by the Council, however, had taken
58
them out again.1
V.

THE LATEST INITIATIVES AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
A.

TiHE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE

IATA

AND

EUROPEAN INITIATIVES

The results accomplished by the two latest initiatives are revolutionary and monumental. In 1995 when IATA filed a petition
before the U.S. Department of Transportation seeking "discussion authority and antitrust immunity" to consider special contracts that would affect the liability regime of its members, and
the European Commission presented a draft proposal for a
Council Regulation time, there were two main flaws to the liability regime established by Warsaw and its progeny: (a) Warsaw
had not achieved its original goal of providing industry-wide uniform rules of liability for death or personal injury caused by airline accidents; and (b) victims were not fairly and adequately
compensated.1 9 While liability rules are still far from uniform,
under both the IIA/MIA and European regimes, the levels of
passenger compensation have been radically improved. In the
past three years alone, the two principles of "unlimited" and "absolute" (up to a certain amount) liability have been slowly but
steadily accepted by a number of airlines. Even if the IATA and
European initiatives prove to be unsuccessful, it is probably true
that "there will almost surely never again be an agreement on
internationally sanctioned limits of liability in air law."1 6 0 That,
by itself, is a remarkable accomplishment, from both a theoretical and practical point of view.
From a theoretical point of view, the latest initiatives and the
adoption of the principle of "unlimited liability" represent the
end of the 1929 regime, with its underlying principles and ratio15" Common Position, supra note 110, at 93, 95.
157

See Decision, supra note 126.

158See EC Regulation, supra note 107.
159 See Baden, supra note 28, at 465.
160 Allan I. Mendelsohn, Warsaw: In Transition or Decline?, 21 AIR & SPACE L.
183, 184 (1996).
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nales, and the first step into a new era of air carrier liability.
Today, everyone involved in international air transportation law
is aware of the fact that the original rationales underlying liability limitations have been surpassed. On one hand, the airline
industry does not need to be protected by artificial limits on liability, as was the case when the Warsaw Convention was first
drafted. Because of rampant technological change and airlines'
vastly improved safety records, coupled with the maturation of
the international insurance market, air carriers today are able to
adequately insure every passenger-even to meet the uniquely
high standards of the United States. The cost of waiving the
limits on liability only adds a negligible increase to the ticket
price. 161

On the other hand, it is clear today that liability limitations
contribute to neither uniformity nor fairness. Uniform limits
on liability strive for identical results, which-because of the
fundamental differences in legal systems, standards of living, social and cultural perceptions, etc.-have proven to be an
unachievable goal. Liability limits are also the principal cause of
unfairness. They have consistently been set too low, causing
plaintiffs to try to "break" them through costly and time consuming litigation.

1 62

With the adoption of unlimited liability, countries and airlines
are seeking a uniform rule that will make it possible to reach fair
and reasonable, although not identical, results that can be accepted by all parties involved in air carrier liability controversies.
From a practical point of view, both initiatives have already
accomplished a relevant goal-to modernize the liability regimes for all major international U.S. airliens and all the Euro161 According to John Westcott, director of underwriting at London-based Hill
Aerospace Syndicate, the waiver of the liability limitation on a London-to-Miami
flight "would cost air travelers an additional 50 cents a ticket to cover the increased premiums airlines would need to pay." InternationalEffort to Update 68Year Old Treaty on Passenger Liability Picks Up Momentum, AiRLINE FIN. NEWS, May
19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library IACNWS File [hereinafter International Effort].
162 The litigation that followed the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in
1983 by a Soviet fighter pilot is just one example of the unfairness of the Warsaw
Convention. In March 1997, after a 14-year legal marathon, Hans EphraimsonAbt was awarded U.S. $2,135,000 (of which U.S. $2,000,000 was punitive damages) for his daughter's death, a 23-year-old graduate student in Asian studies
from Saddle River, New Jersey. About 16 families still have not been compensated, although KAL's willful misconduct was established years ago. SeeJan Hoffman, In His Daughter's Memoy: Grieving Father's 14-Year Crusade Helps Air Crash
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997.
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pean community ones. All United States, as well as some
Canadian and European, airlines involved in international transportation have signed the 11A and the MIA, modified their Conditions of Carriage, and filed appropriate tariffs with the U.S.
Department of Transportation. Presently, the two-tier system of
unlimited and absolute liability up to SDR 100,000 is in effect on
a great number of international flights to and from the United
States.1 63 Moreover, after the entry into force of the European

regulation in October 1998, any passengers flying on an European air carrier is enjoying the new two-tier system.
B.

PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST INITIATIVES

Keeping in mind the two principal goals of reforming the
Warsaw regime (uniform rules and fair compensation), we now
turn to some of the most relevant problems that the latest initiatives have raised or were not able to resolve following the IATA
Agreements and the EU Regulation.

163 The families of the victims in the recent tragic crash of Swissair flight 111,
New York-Geneva, on September 3, 1998, will most likely be the first ones to
benefit from the new two-tier system designed by IATA. At the time of the crash,
Swissair had signed both the IIA and the MIA, and filed a tariff with DOT. Accordingly, families will be able to recover all compensatory damages without having to go through lengthy and expensive litigation. In a statement released by
Swissair only a few hours after the crash, the Swiss airline announced that it "will
compensate relatives of passengers on flight SR 111 for compensatory damages
under the applicable law. Claims of the passengers' families are subject to the
Warsaw Convention and to the General Conditions of Carriage of Swissair." Swissair Offers Immediate Compensation to Families of Passengers on SR 111, Swissair Press
Release, Zurich, Sept. 3, 1998 (visited on Mar. 9, 1999) <http://
www.swissair.com/press_releases/pressrel_030998_2030-en.htm>. The reference
to the General Conditions of Carriage should reinforce our prediction.
It is also interesting to note the effect of the EU regulation on the Swissair case.
Although Swissair, as a Swiss airline, was not bound by the EU regulation, it offered immediate compensation to families of passengers on flight 111, as it is
provided in Article 5 of the EU regulation. The above mentioned press release
stated:
In order to help meet the immediate financial need that may be
experienced by relatives of the passengers on board flight SR 111,
Swissair will, as soon as possible, make payments of CHF 30,000 or
USD 20,000 in respect of each passenger, should they wish this.
Letters are being sent to relatives of all the passengers inviting
them, or their representative, to contact the company if they wish
to take advantage of this.
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1.

The IATA Agreements

a.

The Private Nature of the Agreements

419

IATA's latest initiative is based entirely on the last sentence of
Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention.' 6 4 Like the 1966 Montreal Agreement, both the IIA and the MIA find their legal basis
in this provision. They are, in essence, "special contracts." But
this is all they are-contracts between airlines relating to the liability limitations set in the Warsaw Convention. Because of their
private nature, such provisions have to conform with both the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention and national laws. For example, the refusal of IATA to insert a clause into the IIA/MIA
regime that would provide fori domicilii as the fifth basis of jurisdiction finds its official-even if questionable-explanation in
an arguable prohibition contained in Article 32 of the Warsaw
Convention. Similarly, the IATA Agreements do not seem to enjoy any per se real legal effect until their signatory airlines include the appropriate implementing provisions in their
conditions of carriage or the competent authorities approve
them.
b.

Variable Regimes

The IATA initiative consists' of two agreements that differ substantially from each other. Since a third of the airlines that have
signed the 11A have not signed the MIA, it is very difficult to
predict what the liability regime will be on many of the IHA's
signatory airlines. Questions arise such as: Will they eventually
adopt the MIA and, if not, which of the two options will prevail,
"unconditional waiver" or "waiver plus the law of the passenger's
domicile;" will they waive the Article 20(1) defense and, if so, to
what amount; will they provide for the law of the passenger's
domicile as the governing law for purposes of damage determination? Even assuming that every airline adheres to both the
11A and MIA uncertainties will still remain. For instance, the
MIA (which is supposed to supply the provisions implementing
the 11A) has mandatory and optional provisions that leave carriers the option of waiving the liability limitation without adopting the law of the passenger's domicile as the applicable law to
determine the damages (i.e., the "unconditional waiver"
option).
164

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
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Law Applicable to Damages

Another issue that has not been resolved is the law applicable
to the determination of damages. Without addressing the question of whether it is preferable to apply the law of the passenger's domicile or a different law,165 the MIA, by not adopting
one law is failing to assure uniform rules applicable in all circumstances. In order to know the liability regime to which a
particular airline may be subject, it seems necessary to consult its
conditions of carriage to see how that airline has actually implemented the IATA Agreements. The consequences of this situation are very clear. Non-uniform rules or unclear provisions are
in fact the primary obstacle to the quick settlement of disputes
and the main cause for prolonged litigation and unfair results.
As mentioned previously, the last twenty years of air accidents
have clearly demonstrated this fact.
Moreover, because of the low limits of liability, the importance of the applicable law that determines the compensatory
damages has, until now, very seldom been a serious issue in international air law.1 66 Today, with the waiver of the limitation,
the question of the applicable law becomes significant because it
can make an award of U.S. $20,000 under Bangladeshi law become one of U.S. $2,000,000 under California law.
165 Even if one accepts the supposition that the tort system is designed exclusively to compensate victims, why should a U.S. air carrier only be liable to pay
damages to the family of a Bangladeshi student according to Bangladeshi law
when the ticket was bought in the U.S. by the student at the same price that was
paid by his fellow student from Columbus, Ohio? Should not the benefit of lower
compensation standards be somehow distributed between the airlines and the
victims in a more fair way? A possible compromise could be to provide for
mandatory application of either one of two: (a) the law of the passenger's domicile or (b) the law of the place of issuance of the ticket. The choice could be left
up to the plaintiff-who most surely will decide according to his or her own convenience, i.e., the law which provides the highest award-or the court-which
will choose in order to secure a fair result. If in most cases the two criteria will
point to the same result (i.e., application of the same law), the above mentioned
choice may guarantee a more fair outcome in certain circumstances (as for example in the case of a Bangladeshi student or businessman buying a ticket in the
U.S., and paying U.S. dollars), because it would also take into account the market
where the ticket was sold. For a discussion on conflict of laws in the field of
international air transportation, see generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Mass Torts and
the Conflict of Laws: The Airline Disaster,1989 U. ILL. L. Rs;v. 157 (1989); Yves Van
Couter, Barkanic: The New York Choice-ofLaw Method and Recovery for Air Crashes
Abroad, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 759 (1995); Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving
Conflict-ofLaws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. Rr4v. 129 (1989);
and Mendelsohn, supra note 52.
1; ; See Mendelsohn, supra note 88, at 185.
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Difficulties may arise with regard to the definitions of both
"domicile" and "permanent residence" of the passenger, which
are used as the criteria for determining the law applicable to the
calculation of damages. 6 ' Which rules would a court apply in
determining the "domicile" or "permanent residence" of the
passenger: its own rules, the rules of the country of domicile, the
Warsaw Convention, or some other law?16
d.

Fifth-Forum

Another source of unfairness is the lack of the fifth basis of
jurisdiction. There has always been a strong effort to add the
domicile of the passenger as the fifth forum in order to protect
each passenger (the "wandering American" as well as the "wandering European" or 'Japanese")1 69 from the unfairness of being forced to seek compensation in foreign courts and under
foreign rules. 7 U.S. carriers and the ATA were willing to insert
such a provision in the implementation agreement, but only if
all airlines agreed. As mentioned above, because of strong opposition from the majority of non-U.S. airlines, due to the fear
of high damages awards of U.S. juries, the fifth forum is not
even inserted in the MIA as an optional provision.
As is the case with the applicable law provision, once carriers
have waived the liability limitation, the issue of where a passenger is able to bring suit will be even more important than
before. As Professor Lowenfeld has put it "with or without Warsaw, the place of suit remains critically important, once substantial damages are available but not guaranteed." 7 ' Accordingly,
the failure to include the domicile of the passenger as the fifth
forum in the ILA-MIA regime will again be the cause of considerable unfairness and eventually, we suspect, of an increasing level
of controversy, especially if airlines do not adopt the law of the
167 See

id.

- See Lowenfeld, supra note 49, at 188. But see Mendelsohn, supra note 88 at
141.
169 The argument could well be made by European as well as Japanese passengers, and accordingly is not just an American problem. See Mendelsohn, supra
note 52, at 1077-78.
170 The "fifth forum" was adopted in 1971 in Article XII of the Guatemala Protocol. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. In the face of this precedent, it
is difficult to understand why non-U.S. carriers were reluctant to adopt it in
these IATA agreements.
171 Lowenfeld, supra note 49, at 188.
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passenger's domicile as the law applicable to the determination
of damages. 12
e.

Other Questions
There are a host of other questions that have not even been
considered by any of the recent initiatives. For example, what
are the implications of code-sharing and commercial agreements between different airlines if the liability regimes of both
the contractual and operating carriers are not the same?
Should the obligations and rights of third parties, like manufacturing companies and air traffic control authorities, be determined by, and be included in, the uniform regime that
prescribes the liability rules for carriers? What is the proper definition of domicile and/or permanent residence to be used as
the criteria for choice of law and forum selection clauses in today's global economy? These are some of the issues that will
become increasingly important in the system that follows the
elimination of limits.
2.

The European Regulation

Although the European initiative strengthens the belief that
liability limits are a thing of the past and that the concept of
absolute liability, at least up to a certain level, seems to have
finally been accepted by most of the western world, several issues remain unresolved or controversial. Since the Council regulation resembles the IATA initiative in many aspects, some of
these issues have already been mentioned.
First, the Regulation, based on the special contract provision
of Article 22(1), like the IATA Agreements, must conform to the
provisions of the Convention. Otherwise it would presumably
violate international law. However, unlike the IATA Agreements, the Regulation will supersede any non-conforming national law and will be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all EU Member States.
More importantly, after the elimination of the fifth forum, the
proposed regulation is silent on two matters that will become
key issues in any air accident after the liability limits are removed: (1) the applicable law according to which damages are
to be determined; and (2) the forum where the victims or their
172 Passengers forced to sue in foreign courts (other than these in the U.S.)
under foreign law will often receive much lower compensation than they could
receive according to the standards of the law of their domicile.
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survivors will be able to bring suit. The consequences of such
choices have been already discussed above.
It is interesting to note that the EU's choices have not escaped
notice or criticism. In Washington, D.C., on an internet chat
box for aviation enthusiasts (known colloquially as "Mifnet," after its founder KLM legal counsel, Paul Mifsud), the question
recently arose as to which carriers had filed tariffs with the DOT
and were therefore implementing the IIA and the MIA. A recent article by Mendelsohn was cited suggesting that "except for
about a dozen U.S. carriers and a handful of foreign carriers"
there was no certainty about any other carriers implementing
the IIA and MIA.17 3 Almost immediately, Mr. Frederick Sorensen-V, the EU's aviation guru, logged in with the comment that:
"the EU has done away with the Warsaw limits and any Member
State limits for all Community Air Carriers with effect from 17
October this year. Mendelsohn is therefore not right in referring to only a handful of foreign carriers."174
On March 15, 1998, Mendelsohn responded with the following comments:
Unfortunately, at least on the basis of my last inquiry a month or
so ago, most of the EU carriers (except for BA, LH, and AF) have
not yet filed tariffs with the DOT, and no one knows why they are
reluctant to do so [Swissair, Belair, and Crossair have since done
so] .

.

. Until they file those tariffs .

.

. I believe there's serious

doubt under US law whether their [11A and MIA] agreements are
fully effective. While you're at it, ask Fred for the real story about
what happened when the EU Council last February (1997) abandoned the EU's apparent enthusiasm for the fifth forum. Don't
they want Germans and Frenchmen (etc., etc.) to be able to sue
in Germany or France, or is it a f act .

.

. that they really like

forum shopping and want all of their citizens to hire U.S. lawyers
and sue in the U.S. Nor at this point can there really be any
acceptable argument that the fifth forum might violate Article
32. I think even IATA agrees with that. And how about lex
domicilii? Are the U.S. carriers going to be the only ones on the
175
line for that too?

There has been no reply to date from Mr. Sorensen.
173

Allan I. Mendelsohn, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation:Accident Compensation in International Trans-

portation, 63J. AIR L. & CoM. 433, 436 (1997).
174 This exchange is not published, but is on file with the authors.
175 This exchange is not published, but is on file with the authors.
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Another question relates to the up-front payment provision of
the Regulation, which provides for an advance-payment in case
of death in order to meet immediate economic needs.
Although the concept of an advance payment may be an interesting innovation, such a provision may prove unnecessary, especially if it is imposed as a matter of law. It is unnecessary
because, by eliminating any liability limit, the disincentive to
write the up-front check by underwriters has been eliminated.
Underwriters can be expected to provide advance payments,
simply in order to try to limit the final award for full compensatory damages, which would surely also include those damages
suffered because of the lack of immediate financial support.
The advance-payment provision may also prove counter productive because of the usual penchant for transforming a minimum
1
limit into the maximum limit.

76

The relationship between the EU Regulation and the IATA
Agreements is controversial. The different approach toward the
applicable law for the determination of damages, for example,
constitutes undoubtedly an initial conflict between what could
be the regimes applicable in the United States and the European Union. No provision regarding the law applicable to the
determination of damages has been included in the Regulation.
The European Union thus seems to prefer the unconditional
waiver approach that was abandoned by the U.S. airlines in the
drafting of the IPA. When the Regulation entered into effect on
October 17, 1998, two different regimes became applicable in
the United States and the European Union: (1)"unconditional
waiver" in the European Union; and (2) "waiver plus the law of
the passenger's domicile" in the United States. Such a result
does not contribute to uniformity in airline liability rules. It
does, however, confirm the fundamental flaw of regulating carrier liability through private or regional (i.e., Japan, Europe, the
United States) rules.
In short, the pursuit of the goal of uniform and fair rules for
international air transport may, at least in the next few years,
suffer a setback. Even though the liability limits will disappear
from the conditions of carriage of most of the world's major
airlines (that will mean higher, more adequate compensation
awards for many, though not all, passenger victims), questions
like applicable law, jurisdiction, mandatory insurance, liability
defenses, adequate notice, up-front payments, and indemnifica176

See supra note 112. The Swissair case seems to confirm both suppositions.
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tion rights will differ depending on the regime governing the
particular contract of carriage and on several factors like the nationality of the carrier or the destination of the flight. As discussed above, the absence of uniformity and certain
fundamental provisions (i.e., lex domicilii and fori domicilii) will
only bring increased costs for both the aviation and the insurance industries, less proper information for the consumer, prolonged litigation, forum shopping, and ultimately, less than fair
results for victims and their families.
C.

THE

ICAO

LEGAL COMMITTEE's DRAFT CONVENTION

After the Japanese, IATA, and European initiatives, the latest
action taken by the ICAO will hopefully prove to be the final
chapter in the pursuit of a uniform and fair liability regime for
international air transportation.
The 30th session of the ICAO Legal Committee was held in
Montreal from April 28 to May 9, 1997, under the agenda item
"[t]he modernization of the Warsaw System and review of the
question of the ratification of international air law instruments."
The Legal Committee reviewed and revised a draft instrument
designed to modernize and consolidate the "Warsaw System" by
means of a single self-standing Convention. At the end of its
session, the Legal Committee approved the text of a draft instrument that, at the end of June 1997, was circulated by State letter
so as to afford States and international organizations an opportunity to submit comments.
Since the text approved by the Legal Committee is in fact little more than a first draft, we will only briefly examine those
provisions most relevant to our topic.
The first change from the Warsaw System is found in Article
16, which provides that the carrier is liable for damage sustained
in case of death or "bodily or mental injury" of a passenger, thus
expanding the types of injury that may fall within an airline's
scope of liability. It has been said that this condition would
"open a whole new door."1 7 For instance, a passenger could try
to recover damages for stress (but no physical injury) suffered
1 78
while his flight experienced severe turbulence.
Article 23 specifies the "basis of claims" by stating that, in the
carriage of passengers any action for damages, however
177 InternationalEffort, supra note 161.
178 See ICAO State Letter of 27 June 1997, LE 4151, with attachment A and B
[hereinafter ICAO State letter].
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founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in
tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions
and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention. The
provision seems to close the door on those claims not covered
by the Convention, which lately have attracted some attention.179 It is interesting to note that Article 23 also clarifies that
the term "damage" does not include any punitive, exemplary, or
other non-compensatory damages.
Regarding the liability regime, the Legal Committee has expressed its support for the two-tier system in case of accidental
death or injuries to passengers, according to which, in the first
tier, for claims up to SDR 100,000, the liability of the carrier
would be based on the principle of absolute liability, and for
claims exceeding this amount (second tier), the liability of the
carrier would be based on fault but perhaps without benefit of a
presumption. It is stated in the Explanatory Memorandum,
"concerning the second tier of liability, however, no clear consensus could be reached as to who shall bear the burden of
proof."' 1 While some delegations preferred that the burden
should be on the plaintiff to prove fault of the carrier, the majority of those delegations favored an approach similar to the
Warsaw system and the latest IATA initiatives that fault is presumed unless the airline can prove that it had taken all reasonable measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
it to do so. A compromise was found by inserting three alternatives in Article 20. In the words of the Legal Committee, this is
how Article 20 is structured:
In Alternative 1, each State party shall, upon ratification, notify
which regime shall be applicable to its carriers. Under Alternative 2, each State party would have the possibility of "opting-out"
of the liability regime, which provides for the air carrier's presumed fault, in favor of the regime which places the burden of
proof on the claimant. Alternative 3 establishes a three-tier regime, with strict liability in the first tier, with a second tier on the
179 In July 1997, a federal appeals court in Manhattan ruled that all claims by
U.S. citizens against airlines that are not covered by the Warsaw Convention can
be pursued in U.S. state courts. The case had been brought against El Al Airlines
by Tsui Yuan Teng, who argued that she suffered psychological distress and personal injuries when searched prior to an international flight. The appeals court
held that, although the incident was not an "accident" under Warsaw Article 17,
12 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), the plaintiff could pursue her claim against El Al in the
New York state courts. The case is now pending on appeal before the Supreme
Court.
,so ICAO State Letter, supra note 178, Attachment B.

1999]

JATA AGREEMENTS/EUROPEAN REGULATION

427

basis of presumed fault of the carrier, and with the burden of
proof on the claimant in the third tier. 8 1
Although each of the three proposals constitutes an attempt
at finding a compromise within the Legal Committee, it is evident how the alternative solutions, if adopted, would seriously
endanger uniformity under the new liability regime. Different
rules would be applicable according to the choices of individual
states. The Legal Committee prudently decided to refer the
three alternatives for final consideration to the Diplomatic Conference, thus leaving the issue open for later discussions and
resolution.
A compromise also was required with regard to the inclusion
in the draft Convention of the so-called "fifth jurisdiction" provision. After providing for the Warsaw original four jurisdictions,
Article 27, in paragraph 2, states that
in respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a passenger, the action may be brought in the territory of a state party
in which the passenger has his or her domicile or permanent
residence and to and from which the carrier operates services for
the carriage by2 air [and] [or] in which the carrier has an
18
establishment.
Paragraph 3 specifies that "'establishment' means premises
leased or owned by the carrier concerned from which, [through
its own managerial and administrative employees,] it conducts
its business of carriage by air.' 1 83 It is clear how the fifth jurisdiction is limited by the specific conditions of both paragraph 2
and 3 of Article 27. A plaintiff could sue in his or her country of
domicile or residence only if the airline maintains a virtually full
operational presence in that country. 8 4 In light of the recent
actions taken by IATA and the European Union, the presence of
at least a "limited" fifth basis of jurisdiction is to be considered a
positive first step of the draft Convention. But like the liability
regime, the Legal Committee decided to refer Article 27,
paragraphs 2 and 3, as a whole for final consideration by the
Diplomatic Conference.

181
182
183

Id.

Id. Attachment A.
Id. art. 27, 1 3.

184 It is difficult to understand how the legal committee could have proposed
anything less comprehensive than was adopted in Article XII of the Guatemala
Protocol in 1971. See supra note 170.
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There are also provisions addressing for the first time issues
such as the possibility of stipulating arbitration agreement between the parties to the contract of carriage for both passenger
and cargo," 5 the respective liabilities in case the carriage by air
is performed by a person (i.e., an actual carrier) other than the
contracting carrier," 6 and the freedom of the carrier to make
advance payments based on the immediate economic needs of
families of victims or survivors of accidents. 8 "
Unfortunately, like in the EU Regulation, there is no provision regarding the law applicable for the determination of damages. There is no persuasive explanation why the Legal
Committee did not include some provision, even if alternatives,
for choice of damage law. With four or five fora from which to
choose, plaintiffs will certainly have the chance to forum shop,
which, in the interests of uniformity and fairness, should be
avoided.
The complex process of modernizing the Warsaw system is at
its earliest stage. It is even questionable whether the Legal Committee's draft is sufficiently refined as to warrant referral at this
stage to a Diplomatic Conference. A more prudent approach
might be to refer the draft back to the Legal Committee for an
additional year of study in the light of comments received from
member states. After so many years of hesitation and experimentation, which still continue today, it may be unseemly now
to rush to a Diplomatic Conference without the kind of active
intellectual thought that should be given to a document of this
Sooner or later, however, there must be a final
importance.'
185

See id., art. 28.

1s16See id., art. 3342.
187 See id., art. 44.
188 In a decision of the ICAO Council in November 1997, a Special Group on
the modernization and Consolidation of the "Warsaw System" was established to
review the draft of the legal committee. The Special Group held its meeting
from April 14-18, 1998, in Montreal and approved an amended draft text that was
submitted to the ICAO Council for consideration during its 154th session. On
June 3, 1998, the Council decided to convene a Diplomatic Conference for the
adoption of said draft Convention to be held from May 10-29, 1999, in Montreal
unless an invitation is received from a Contracting State to hold the conference.
Therefore, the arrangements as to the location of the conference are to be further reviewed later this year. The following are a few of the changes worth mentioning in the amended draft: (a) regarding the carrier's liability, Article 16 has
deleted the reference to "mental damages," and Article 20 has chosen alternative
1, i.e., the two- tier system of absolute-up to 100,000 S.D.R.-and presumed
unlimited liability; and (b) relating to the jurisdictional provision, the amended
Article 27 provides for a still "limited" fifth-forum right, although one of the two
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draft. As it is stated in one of the recitals of the current draft,
everyone today is "convinced that collective State action for further harmonization and codification of certain rules governing
international carriage by air through a new Convention is the
most adequate means of achieving an equitable balance of
interests." 18 9
VI.

CONCLUSION

By exploiting the special contract provision of Article 22 (1) of
the Convention, several members of IATA and the European
Union have attempted to modernize the airline liability regime,
in particular by waiving all limits on liability.
In light of the private and regional nature of such initiatives,
the different regimes that the IATA Agreements and the EU
Regulation will establish, and several issues which have not yet
been resolved, the two principal goals of any attempt at reforming the Warsaw Convention-i.e., uniform rules and fair
damage compensation-have not yet been achieved.
While under both the IIA/MIA regime and the European initiative the levels of passenger's compensation have been radically improved, the goal of more certain and more uniform
liability rules continues to be elusive. Moreover, and as mentioned earlier, non-uniformity will bring increased costs for both
the aviation and the insurance industries, general consumer disinformation, prolonged litigation, forum shopping, and ultimately unfair results.
While the results that both IATA and the European Union
have accomplished in the past few years are extraordinary, there
is no doubt that a fair and uniform liability system in this field of
international air transportation law can only be achieved
through inter-governmental action and a new Convention.
limitations, the establishment requirement, has been somehow relaxed (the fo/
domicilii must be a place "in which that carrier conducts its business of carriage by
air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with
which it has a commercial agreement," where "commercial agreement" means
"an agreement, other than an agency agreement, made between carriers and relating to the provision or marketing of their joint services for carriage by air.").
189 ICAO State Letter, supra note 178, Attachment A. At its 32nd session in
October 1998, the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) endorsed the convening of a Diplomatic Conference in May 1999. It also
requested the Council and the ICAO secretariat to take appropriate action, such
as regional seminars, in order that states may better prepare their positions in
anticipation of the Diplomatic Conference. See ICAO press release on 5 October
1998 (visited on Mar. 9, 1999) <http://www.icao.org/icao/en/nr/pio9812.htm>.

430

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

Such an effort, which should not be undertaken lightly nor
rushed, will do away with all of the different "special contracts"
and provide for a system that "people can understand and rely
upon, .

.

. a system that works to bridge the awkwardness and

difficulty of the international air transportation system that people encounter in attempting to get compensation for their
losses."19 The demand for government-level action is also mandated by the need to take into account and resolve a host of
issues that were either not considered or not finally resolved by
any of the recent initiatives nor by the ICAO Legal Committee
in its work to date. However long it may still take, the road toward a fair and uniform liability regime in international air
transportation is no longer merely a fantasy.

190 Warren Dean, Address at the Meeting of N.Y. County Lawyers Association
Evening Forum (Feb. 3, 1994); Warren L. Dean, Panel Discussion: The Japanese
Initiative: Absolute Unlimited Liability in InternationalAir Travel, in 60 J. AiR L. &
COM. 819, 836 (1995).

